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SUSPENSION AND DELEGATION
Amy Coney Barrett†
A suspension of the writ of habeas corpus empowers the President to
indefinitely detain those suspected of endangering the public safety.  In other
words, it works a temporary suspension of civil liberties.  Given the gravity of
this power, the Suspension Clause narrowly limits the circumstances in
which it may be exercised:  the writ may be suspended only in cases of “rebel-
lion or invasion” and when “the public Safety may require it.”  Congress
alone can suspend the writ; the Executive cannot declare himself authorized
to detain in violation of civil rights.  Despite the traditional emphasis on the
importance of exclusive legislative authority over suspension, the statutes
that Congress has enacted are in tension with it.  Each of the suspension
statutes has delegated broad authority to the President, permitting him in
almost every case to decide whether, when, where, and for how long to exercise
emergency power.  Indeed, if all of these prior statutes are constitutional,
Congress could today enact a law authorizing the President to suspend the
writ in Guanta´namo Bay if he decides at some point in the (perhaps distant)
future that the constitutional prerequisites are satisfied.  Such a broad dele-
gation undermines the structural benefits that allocating the suspension deci-
sion to Congress is designed to achieve.  This Article explores whether such
delegations are constitutionally permissible.  It concludes that while the Sus-
pension Clause does not prohibit Congress from giving the President some
responsibility for the suspension decision, it does require Congress to decide
the most significant constitutional predicates for itself:  that an invasion or
rebellion has occurred and that protecting the public safety may require the
exercise of emergency power.  Congress made this determination during the
Civil War, but it violated the Suspension Clause in every other case by enact-
ing a suspension statute before an invasion or rebellion actually occurred—
and in some instances, before one was even on the horizon.
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INTRODUCTION
After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Ha-
waii, thereby empowering authorities to preventatively and indefi-
nitely detain anyone suspected of endangering the public.  He relied
on a forty-one-year-old statute authorizing the President to suspend
the privilege in that territory whenever he determined that a rebellion
or an invasion had occurred and that protecting the public safety re-
quired it.  This statute was a remarkable delegation of authority to the
Executive insofar as it enabled him to both trigger and define the
scope of his own emergency power.  It does not stand in isolation, for
the seven federal suspension statutes enacted since the Civil War have
all delegated suspension power to the President.1
A sweeping assignment of suspension authority to the President
sits uneasily with the widespread insistence of scholars and judges that
1 See Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, § 6, 64 Stat. 384, 386 (delegating authority to
suspend writ in Guam); Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 699, § 20, 49 Stat. 1807, 1812 (Virgin
Islands); Phillipines Organic Act, 32 Stat. 691, 692 (1902) (Philippines); 31 Stat. 77, 81
(1900) (Puerto Rico); Hawaii Organic Act, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900) (Hawaii); Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 14–15 (1871) (authorizing a suspension of habeas corpus in areas
affected by Ku Klux Klan activity); Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 755, 755
(1863) (granting the President power to suspend habeas corpus during the Civil War).
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for formal and functional reasons, suspension is an exclusively legisla-
tive task.  The chief function of the writ is to protect from executive
detention in violation of civil rights.  Because a suspension of the
writ’s privilege grants the executive emergency power to detain in vio-
lation of civil rights, giving the President charge of the decision to
suspend concentrates tremendous power in his hands.  Building on
settled English practice, our constitutional tradition has almost unfail-
ingly treated the suspension decision as belonging to the legislature, a
body that is more deliberative, more politically representative, and less
biased in favor of exercising emergency power in a national security
crisis.  Broad delegations of suspension authority to the President ar-
guably undercut the protection offered by this institutional arrange-
ment.  While there is virtual unanimity in the view that the
Constitution vests Congress alone with the power to suspend, the
question whether Congress is constrained in its ability to delegate this
power is difficult and unsettled.2
The Constitution provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”3  A decision to sus-
pend the privilege thus requires two determinations: (1) that a
rebellion or an invasion exists, and (2) that protecting the public
safety may require the exercise of emergency power.  This Article asks
whether Congress must itself determine the existence of these predi-
cates to suspension or whether it can delegate either or both of these
decisions to the Executive Branch.  In so doing, the Article addresses a
gap in the scholarly debate about the ways in which the Suspension
Clause limits the power of the political branches.
After Part I recounts the rationale for vesting the suspension
power in Congress, Part II discusses how legislatures have historically
allocated responsibility for the suspension decision.  The practice in
that regard has varied widely over time.  While Parliament and found-
ing-era state legislatures suspended the privilege outright, the Civil
War Congress introduced the delegation model in the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1863 after President Abraham Lincoln’s unilateral and contro-
2 See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 411, 429 n.106 (2006) (“The scope of Congress’s power to delegate sus-
pension authority has never been conclusively determined, and there is considerable varia-
tion in the legislation authorizing past suspensions.”); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 689–90 (2009) (“Historically and functionally speaking,
. . . the executive should not be understood to lay claim to the unilateral power to suspend.
But beyond this important premise, many very difficult questions remain. . . .  [M]ay Con-
gress delegate the ultimate decision to suspend to the President?”); Developments in the
Law, Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1265 n.14 (1970) [hereinafter Federal
Habeas Corpus] (“The validity of a delegation [of suspension power] or the terms of a dele-
gation have apparently never been clearly adjudicated.”).
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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versial decision to suspend.  There was no doubt in 1863 that a rebel-
lion was underway, but in a departure from historical practice, the
statute allowed the President to determine whether, when, where, and
for how long protection of the public safety required suspension.  The
1863 Act was an influential legislative precedent: all subsequent fed-
eral suspension statutes followed its delegation model.  The Recon-
struction Congress authorized President Ulysses S. Grant to suspend
the privilege of the writ if he decided that Klan activity in the South
rose to the level of a rebellion sufficiently threatening the public
safety.  A series of twentieth-century statutes enacted outside the con-
text of any particular security crisis conferred still greater power upon
the President.  In these five statutes, which all governed United States
territories, Congress empowered the President to exercise emergency
power in response to any invasion or rebellion that might arise in the
future.  Despite the dominance of the delegation model in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, a study of history reveals repeated
challenges to it on the ground that the Constitution renders the sus-
pension decision wholly nondelegable.  Indeed, Part II emphasizes
that the separation of powers controversy in this context has been
more complicated than the notorious “Lincoln versus Congress” fight
about whether Congress alone possesses the power to initiate a sus-
pension.  The emergence of the delegation model provoked a recur-
ring debate about whether Congress could empower the President to
decide when, where, and for how long to suspend the privilege of the
writ.  This debate identifies issues that may well arise in the future.
For example, could Congress give the President advance authoriza-
tion to suspend the writ in Guanta´namo Bay whenever he concludes
that a terrorist invasion of the United States has occurred and that the
public safety requires it?
Part III confronts a threshold constitutional objection to delega-
tion in the context of suspension.  Congress structured each of the
seven federal suspension statutes as a contingent delegation—a stat-
ute triggered by the Executive’s determination that some condition
has been satisfied.  Consistent with this contingent format, none of
the suspension statutes suspended the writ outright; instead, each
gave the President discretion to suspend once he concluded that
there was a rebellion or an invasion and that requisite threat to public
safety existed.  An initial difficulty with these statutes is that they per-
mitted the President to temporarily repeal otherwise binding federal
law in violation of Article I, Section 7’s requirement of bicameralism
and presentment.  Part III explains that while this objection is fatal to
these statutes as written, the flaw could have been avoided by careful
drafting.  As far as Article I, Section 7 is concerned, Congress can
grant the President what is functionally the authority to repeal statutes
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so long as it ensures that the consequence of repeal formally flows
from the statute rather than the executive order.  In other words,
Congress cannot authorize the President to suspend the writ, but it
can render suspension an automatic consequence of the President’s
determination that the conditions for the statute’s effectiveness exist.
Article I, Section 7 thus does not itself pose an insurmountable barrier
to Congress’s ability to give the President control of a suspension’s
timing.
Part IV explores whether the Suspension Clause alters Congress’s
otherwise broad power to delegate responsibility to the Executive
Branch.  Contingent delegations are often desirable because they al-
low Congress the flexibility to provide in advance for events that it
cannot foresee.  The Suspension Clause, however, establishes an im-
portant exception to the general rule permitting contingent legisla-
tion.  It is well recognized that the Clause serves as a substantive limit
describing the circumstances under which Congress can authorize
emergency power.  Unappreciated is that the Clause also serves as a
temporal limit dictating the time at which Congress can enact the au-
thorization.  For both historical and functional reasons, its proscrip-
tion of suspension “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it”4 is best understood as prohibiting Con-
gress from passing a suspension statute unless the country is actually
in a state of rebellion or invasion.  That said, the Clause does not rule
out contingent delegations altogether.  By its very terms, Congress
need only decide that “the public Safety may require [suspension]”5
before it enacts a suspension statute.  Thus, so long as Congress con-
cludes that an invasion or rebellion presently exists and that the pub-
lic safety is in a precarious state, it can task the President with
determining the point at which protecting the public safety actually
requires the exercise of emergency power.
While the Suspension Clause limits Congress’s ability to employ
contingent delegations, Part V maintains that it does not demand that
Congress further constrain the President’s discretion.  Historically,
critics of the federal suspension statutes have claimed that Congress
can leave the President virtually no discretion in defining a suspen-
sion’s scope.  In particular, they have objected to the omission of re-
straints traditionally included in parliamentary and early state
suspension legislation.  Those laws almost invariably contained a sun-
set clause and a requirement that only a defined set of the
highest-ranking executive officials could order preventative arrests.  In
contrast to these laws, the seven federal statutes have given the Presi-
dent almost total power to define the suspension’s terms.  Only one
4 Id.
5 Id. (emphasis added).
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statute contained a sunset clause, and only two included any sort of
geographic limitation.  None prohibited the President from subdele-
gating his power to declare the writ suspended, much less to issue
warrants for mere suspects.  Yet while these restrictions may be advisa-
ble as a matter of policy, nothing in the text of the Clause either ex-
pressly or impliedly requires them.  The default rule of congressional
freedom to implement legislation as it sees fit thus remains in place.
History nonetheless reveals the consequences of omitting these kinds
of restraints from suspension statutes: broad statutes tend to yield
broad executive orders and thus impose a greater cost upon civil
liberty.
Scholarly discourse about suspension and separation of powers
focuses on whether Congress or the President has the authority to sus-
pend.  In that respect, it flows from the argument that Lincoln began
when he suspended the writ of his own accord in 1861.  The debate,
however, should look beyond the terms of that argument to its result.
While Lincoln ultimately lost his claim of executive prerogative, his
battle with Congress yielded a new statutory model that significantly
increased the President’s role in the suspension decision.  A suspen-
sion accomplished by delegation provokes reflection upon precisely
what it means to insist that suspension power is exclusively legislative.
The answer is not, as members of Congress have sometimes claimed,
that the suspension decision is wholly nondelegable, but neither do
the default, permissive rules of the nondelegation doctrine apply.  In-
stead, the legislative responsibility is expressed through the temporal
limit of the Suspension Clause, which requires Congress itself to de-
cide that a rebellion or an invasion actually exists before it enlists the
Executive’s assistance in deciding whether suspension is a necessary
response to a security crisis.
I
THE DELEGATION PROBLEM
A. Congress’s Exclusive Authority to Suspend the Writ
To understand the significance of the choice to allocate the sus-
pension power to Congress, it is necessary to be clear about the grave
consequences of suspension.  The writ’s core purpose is to safeguard
individual liberty against arbitrary executive detention.6  When a pris-
oner invokes the privilege, the Executive (or a representative) must
explain to a court why detention of the individual is consistent with
due process.  If the court is not satisfied with the response, it will or-
der the prisoner’s release.  When the privilege of the writ is sus-
6 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1162 (6th ed. 2009).
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pended,7 however, the Executive is freed from the constraints of the
criminal process and courts are powerless to order the release of any
prisoner detained pursuant to the suspension.8  As this design sug-
gests, suspension functions as a grant of emergency power.9  It en-
hances the Executive’s ability to contain a crisis by withdrawing core
protections like the prohibition upon seizure in the absence of proba-
ble cause and the right to be released if not charged and tried.10  The
upshot is that the Executive can detain preventatively and indefinitely
without affording the detainee any of means of defending herself.
The power is so extreme that the Suspension Clause restricts its exer-
cise to a very limited class of emergencies:  “when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”11
Scholars and courts have overwhelmingly endorsed the position
that, Lincoln’s unilateral suspensions of the writ notwithstanding,12
the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive authority to decide
7 Technically speaking, it is the writ’s privilege, not the writ itself, that is suspended.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (providing that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended”).  In keeping with the shorthand frequently employed by
the cases and literature, see, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 6, at 1160 (referring to “a Sus- R
pension of the Writ”), I will use the phrases “suspending the writ” and “suspending the
privilege of the writ” interchangeably.
8 See David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 59, 89 (2006) (maintaining that a suspension “frees the Executive from
the legal restraints on detention that would otherwise apply”); Tyler, supra note 2, at R
672–87 (arguing that a suspension relieves the Executive both of the duty to account to a
court and the duty to comply with the criminal process). But see Trevor W. Morrison,
Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1575–79 (2007) (ar-
guing that a suspension enables the Executive to detain without answering to a court but
does not relieve him of the obligation to comply with the due process rights that the de-
tainee may vindicate when the suspension ends).
9 See Tyler, supra note 2, at 603–04. R
10 Amanda Tyler explains that by the time of the Founding, “the privilege had
come . . . to be equated with a host of protections including the rights to presentment or
indictment, speedy trial, and reasonable bail where applicable.”  Amanda L. Tyler, The For-
gotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 999 (2012).  Suspension
is the only mechanism by which those owing allegiance to the United States can be de-
prived of these protections. See id. at 1000.  Some contend that a declaration of martial law
functions as a de facto suspension of the writ’s privilege. See, e.g., JOEL PARKER, HABEAS
CORPUS AND MARTIAL LAW: A REVIEW OF THE OPINION OF CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY, IN THE CASE
OF JOHN MERRYMAN 24 (2d ed. 1862) (“[I]n time of actual war, . . . there may be justifiable
refusals to obey the command of the writ without any act of Congress, or any order . . . of
the President[;] . . . the existence of martial law . . . is, ipso facto, a suspension of the writ.”).
The effect of a declaration of martial law is a complicated topic beyond the scope of this
Article, which deals only with statutes formally authorizing the exercise of emergency
power.  It is worth observing, however, that even if a situation warranting the exercise of
martial law effectively justifies the Executive in detaining mere suspects, his defense in a
later civil suit (absent an indemnity statute) would likely be that he violated the law be-
cause of necessity—not, as in the case of suspension, that he violated no law. See infra notes
34, 281 and accompanying text. R
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
12 See infra note 110 and accompanying text. R
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when the predicates specified by the Suspension Clause are satisfied.13
In other words, the President cannot exercise emergency power un-
less Congress authorizes him to do so.  The presence of the Suspen-
sion Clause in Article I is the most important evidence that the
decision to suspend rests with Congress.  While the Clause, written in
the passive voice, does not itself identify who has authority to suspend,
its placement in Article I reflects an assumption that Congress is the
branch to which the authority belongs.14
History strongly supports this interpretation.  The Framers’ expe-
rience as subjects of the King of England left them suspicious of
sweeping executive power, and not even the King possessed the power
to suspend the writ.15  Parliament alone possessed the power to sus-
13 Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md.
1861) is the seminal defense of this position. See also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory:
Martial Law, the Suspension Power, and the Insurrection Act, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 391, 408 (2007)
(“[A] number of courts confronted some form of the legal question raised in Ex parte
Merryman, and virtually all of them reached a similar conclusion—i.e., that Lincoln’s ex-
tralegislative suspension of habeas corpus was unconstitutional.”); id. at 408 n.117 (collect-
ing citations).  While these lower court opinions are the only ones that address the
question directly, dicta and separate opinions from the Supreme Court are consistent with
this view. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 562 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Although [the Suspension Clause] does not state that suspension must be effected by, or
authorized by, a legislative act, it has been so understood . . . .”); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S.
75, 101 (1807) (“If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the
powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say
so.”).  For a thorough argument in favor of exclusive congressional suspension power, see
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Great Suspender’s Unconstitutional Suspension of the Great
Writ, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 575 (2010); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1336, at 208–09 (photo. reprint 1991) (1833)
[hereinafter STORY’S COMMENTARIES] (treating the suspension power as exclusively legisla-
tive); Shapiro, supra note 8, at 71–72 (maintaining that the Constitution gives the power R
exclusively to Congress); Tyler, supra note 2, at 687–89 (arguing that structural, historical, R
and functional arguments foreclose any claim that the Executive possesses the suspension
power); Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1263–65 (arguing that constitutional history R
and structure support the proposition that suspension power belongs exclusively to Con-
gress).  Some have defended the constitutionality of Lincoln’s action. See, e.g., DANIEL FAR-
BER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 163 (2003) (asserting that “although the constitutional issue
can hardly be considered free from doubt, on balance Lincoln’s use of habeas in areas of
insurrection or actual war should be considered constitutionally appropriate”); Paul
Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of Crisis: Our Civil War Experience—A History Lesson for a
Post-9–11 America, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 25, 33–41 (2003) (defending Lin-
coln’s unilateral suspension as constitutional).  Delegation obviously poses no problem for
those adopting this view.
14 See Shapiro, supra note 8, at 71 (maintaining that given the Clause’s placement in R
Article I, “the inference that the power to authorize belongs to the legislature seems a
natural one”).
15 See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 151 (“If the [P]resident of the United States may sus-
pend the writ, then the constitution of the United States has conferred upon him more
regal and absolute power over the liberty of the citizen, than the people of England have
thought it safe to entrust to the crown . . . .”); see also Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at R
1264 (“[T]he dominant climate at the Convention of fear of executive power renders it
improbable that the Constitution gave the President greater powers than the King with
respect to habeas.” (citations omitted)).
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pend,16 and following suit, newly formed American states treated the
power as exclusively legislative.17  Notes from the convention debates,
records of the ratifying conventions, and writings of the first several
generations of Americans are virtually unanimous in treating the sus-
pension power as exclusively legislative.18  Indeed, until the Civil War,
there was apparently no serious suggestion that the Executive pos-
sesses a unilateral power to suspend the writ.19
Allocating the suspension power to Congress has a number of
structural implications.  First and foremost, locating the suspension
power in the legislature provides structural protection from executive
excess.20  A suspension places dramatic power in the President’s
hands: it essentially permits him to preventatively and indefinitely de-
tain persons he deems dangerous.  English kings had abused this
power, which is one reason Parliament withdrew it from the Crown.21
16 See Prakash, supra note 13, at 592–93 (describing English history in detail); see also R
Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts,
and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 623 (2008) (“Suspension after 1689 was char-
acterized by one feature more than any other: it could only be made by Parliament.”);
Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 2, at 1264 (“[W]hen the framers looked to practice in R
England, they saw a system in which exclusive suspension powers resided in Parliament. . . .
It seems unlikely that the framers would choose to alter this scheme by granting suspen-
sion powers to authorities other than the legislature, and even more unlikely that they
would do so without a clear statement.”).
17 See Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Power to Suspend Habeas Corpus: An Answer from the Argu-
ments Surrounding Ex parte Merryman, 34 U. BALT. L. REV. 11, 47 (2004) (“[S]tate constitu-
tions vested the suspension power in their legislatures rather than [in] their executives.”);
Prakash, supra note 13, at 593–94 (describing early state practice). R
18 See Prakash, supra note 13, at 593–97 (describing framing and ratification debates R
about the Suspension Clause, all of which treated the power as legislative when they dis-
cussed a source of authority); id. at 597 (pointing out that it never occurred to anyone
during the Burr Conspiracy that Jefferson could have suspended the writ himself); id. at
597–98 (laying out extensive evidence that nineteenth century “[t]reatise writers refer-
enced the congressional monopoly repeatedly”); id. at 598 (“The only Attorney General to
opine on the issue prior to the Civil War, Caleb Cushing, noted that in the United States,
only legislatures could suspend.”).  Prakash notes that then-General Andrew Jackson’s uni-
lateral declaration of martial law in New Orleans, which Jackson treated as a suspension, is
the only piece of contrary evidence. Id. at 599.  But as Prakash observes, the defenses of
Jackson are difficult to take seriously.  They were not only “mired in partisanship” but also
rested on the “fantastic claim that the Constitution authorized every military commander
to suspend, a claim never made before or since.” Id. at 602.
19 See Tyler, supra note 2, at 688 n.415 (“Notably, to my knowledge, it was not until the R
Civil War that anyone ever suggested that the power could be wielded unilaterally by the
executive.”).
20 Indeed, the primary function of the writ itself is protecting against executive excess.
See Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585, 590 (2010) (“In the
American Colonies as well [as in Britain], the Great Writ was considered a primary safe-
guard of individual liberty against a tyrannical Executive.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2003) (describing the writ “as protection
against the pervasive tyranny and illegitimacy of an unchecked executive”).
21 See Prakash, supra note 13, at 592–93 (describing how England’s Habeas Corpus Act R
of 1679 and its 1689 amendment secured legislative control over suspension).  As Justice
Taney put it in Ex parte Merryman, “no one can believe that . . . [the framers] would have
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 10 10-JAN-14 11:01
260 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:251
The gravity of the power and the precedent for its misuse loomed
large in the minds of those who framed and ratified the Constitu-
tion.22  To be sure, as Edward Bates, Lincoln’s Attorney General,
pointed out in Lincoln’s defense, the Executive is not the only one
capable of abusing the power; it is susceptible to legislative abuse as
well.23  Yet concentrating the power to suspend and the resulting
power to preventatively detain in the same hands increases the risk
and is in considerable tension with the Constitution’s general scheme
of separated powers.24
One need not envision a tyrannical Executive to appreciate the
value of denying the President the suspension power.  Giving the deci-
sion to Congress checks the judgment of the person most institution-
ally inclined to think suspension is necessary, even when that person
acts upon his good-faith perception of the national interest.25  The
President, as Commander in Chief, is the first responder in the event
of an armed conflict on American soil.  Because he is in the thick of
the conflict and the one with primary responsibility for beating it
back, it is natural for him to want to use any tool at his disposal to do
so.  He would be more likely than Congress to approach the option of
emergency power with a bias in favor of its use.  Congress, while not a
neutral observer in the event of either an internal or external attack
on the United States, is institutionally more removed from the situa-
tion.  Because it will feel the heat of the moment less intensely than
the President, putting the suspension decision in Congress’s hands
creates an opportunity for cooler heads to prevail.
Locating the suspension power in Congress does more than
guard against tyranny and offset the risk of institutional bias.  Forcing
the decision to be made within the procedural confines of the formal
legislative process better advances the goal that the writ be suspended
as rarely as possible and only after careful deliberation.26  Consider
conferred on the [P]resident a power which the history of England had proved to be dan-
gerous and oppressive in the hands of the crown; and which the people of England had
compelled it to surrender.”  17 F. Cas. 144, 150 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
22 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
23 See Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74,
84 (1861) (“Why should this power be denied to the President, on the ground of its liabil-
ity to abuse, and not denied to the other departments on the same grounds?”) (emphasis in
original).
24 See Tyler, supra note 2, at 688. R
25 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2068 (2007) (“To put a familiar point
bluntly, human nature makes the executive branch all too likely to favor security over lib-
erty in times of crisis.”).
26 See Tyler, supra note 2, at 688 (“Not only does the Suspension Clause require the R
existence of a ‘Rebellion or Invasion,’ in such circumstances, any decision to suspend must
also emerge from the arduous process of bicameralism and presentment, internal checks
. . . that ensure careful deliberation on a decision of this magnitude.”).
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the differences, from a constitutional point of view, in the process that
produces an executive order and the process that produces a statute.
As a single actor, the Executive is capable of moving quickly.  He need
not consult other executive officers for advice,27 nor must he consult
or even inform Congress before he acts.  At the end of the day, his is
the only judgment that counts.  Congress, by contrast, is institutionally
designed to be slower moving.  The decision rests with hundreds of
people rather than one.  Even putting aside the vetogates erected by
the committee process, which is a matter of internal policy rather than
constitutional command, the requirement of bicameralism poses a sig-
nificant barrier to a bill’s passage.28  Either house can kill a bill, and a
bill that successfully navigates both houses reflects compromise on the
language and scope of the proposed legislation.29  A President has lit-
tle incentive to limit the scope of his own emergency power, but the
legislative process is likely to yield a statute that imposes at least some
restraint upon the Executive.30  In sum, legislative suspensions are not
easy to accomplish, and when they occur, the need to secure majority
buy-in inevitably narrows their scope.
Rendering the decision legislative also ensures that a decision to
suspend emerges from a process that is relatively more representative
of the people whose civil liberties are at stake.31  The President has a
27 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President . . . may require the Opinion, in
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
28 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1442–43 (2008) (“To become a federal law, a proposal must pass through multiple
‘vetogates’—not just adoption by floor majorities in both the House and the Senate and
presentment to the President as required by Article I, Section 7, but also those internal
vetogates Congress has created pursuant to Article I, Section 5: substantive committees in
both chambers, calendar expedition through the Rules Committee (House) or unanimous
consent agreements (Senate), and supermajorities if there is a Senate filibuster.”).
29 See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2409–19 (2003)
(explaining that a bill cannot survive the complexities of the legislative process unless legis-
lators compromise on its terms).
30 For example, both the Civil War and Reconstruction statutes imposed a cap on the
length of time that the President could hold detainees without charging them. See infra
notes 82–83, 136 and accompanying text.  Lincoln’s unilateral order, by contrast, con- R
tained no limitations upon his ability to detain. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
31 Cf. William L. Sharkey, Essay on Habeas Corpus (June 1933) (printed in F. Garvin
Davenport, The Essay on Habeas Corpus in the Judge Sharkey Papers, 23 MISS. VALLEY HIST.
REV. 243, 245 (1936)) (“When the writ of Habeas Corpus is to be suspended, we have a
right to be heard and to decide whether the public safety requires it.  The people did not
confide this delicate duty to the President, they hold their representatives responsible for
its exercise.”).  Of course, the benefit of electoral accountability inures only to those enti-
tled to vote, a category excluding noncitizens, among others.  While citizens living in
American territories are not directly represented by members of Congress, they do typi-
cally have at least some voice in the legislative process.  Nonvoting delegates have repre-
sented territories in Congress since 1787, and they have sat in the House of Representatives
since 1794. See BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40555, DELEGATES TO THE U.S.
CONGRESS: HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS 1, 4 (2011).  Their ability to serve on and vote in
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national constituency; members of Congress represent regional inter-
ests.32  Because the need for suspension is likely to be keenest in the
geographic area invaded or under the sway of rebellion, the interests
of those most affected will be best expressed by their senators and
representatives.  The ability of senators and representatives to partici-
pate in debates about and cast votes on the suspension decision gives
regional interests a voice in the process.  They have no similar influ-
ence over the Executive’s decision-making process; indeed, they may
not know that the President is considering suspension until a decision
has already been made.  Nor will they necessarily be able to hold the
President accountable after the fact at the ballot box.  The region
might not control enough electoral votes to have a significant impact
on the next presidential election, and in any event, the President re-
sponsible might not run.  The lack of term limits in Congress makes it
reasonably likely that the prospect of reelection will force a member
of Congress to take the interests of her constituents into account.  If a
President is in his second term, he may have party loyalty, but he has
no electoral accountability.
One might reasonably resist the proposition that suspensions
must be accomplished by statute.  Lincoln did.  The Commander in
Chief power commits battlefield decisions to the President precisely
because they require quick, decisive action by either one person or
the military officials accountable to him.  Because suspension is a
means of defending the country in a national security crisis, it bears
some resemblance to the package of decisions the President will si-
multaneously make with respect to military strategy.  But for better or
worse, the fact that the Constitution does not vest this power in the
President reflects a judgment that this decision—one with a dramatic
impact on domestic civil liberties—ought not be included in this pack-
age.  Moreover, it is not as if the suspension power is a lone exception
to an otherwise absolute power of the President to make decisions
regarding the defense of the country when it is under attack.  On the
contrary, decisions about military conflict are decisions that the Presi-
dent and Congress share.  For example, Article I gives Congress the
authority to declare war, and Congress’s appropriations power gives it
committees has varied over time, but today, all delegates and Puerto Rico’s resident com-
missioner “shall be elected to serve on standing committees in the same manner as Mem-
bers . . . [and] may be appointed to any select committee and to any conference
committee.” JOHN V. SULLIVAN, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO.
111-157, at 376, 378 (2011).
32 Committing the decision to Congress rather than the President is also more protec-
tive of small states because their equal representation in the Senate gives them “dispropor-
tionate power, relative to their populations, to defeat legislation that promotes the
interests of the larger states at their expense.”  John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of
the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 76 (2001).
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tremendous influence over the conduct of military operations.33  Re-
sponsibility for military decisions is coordinated, with the President
bearing primary responsibility for some and Congress bearing it for
others.  Suspension is one that falls on the congressional side of the
ledger.  As Saikrishna Prakash has observed, the suspension power is
one “given to Congress because of a sense, borne out by history, that
vesting such powers with the Executive might prove dangerous to civil
liberties.  Though that cautious approach to executive authority has
its costs, there will be drawbacks associated with any allocation of
power.”34
In sum, the heavy weight of commentary and public opinion for
several hundred years is at odds with Lincoln’s view that the President
should be “the sole judge, both of the exigency which requires him to
act, and of the manner in which it is most prudent for him to employ
the powers entrusted to him.”35  To better protect civil liberty, the
Constitution commits to Congress the decision whether a rebellion or
an invasion exists and so threatens the public safety that the exercise
of emergency power is warranted.
B. Delegation
This, at least, is the theory.  We have tended to approach the
problem of suspension power as an either–or question, presumably
because Lincoln’s infamous unilateral suspensions framed it that way:
either the President has the authority to suspend or the authority be-
longs exclusively to Congress.  The reality that emerged after Lin-
coln’s claim, however, is more complex.
Congress enacted the first federal suspension statute, the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1863, in the wake of Lincoln’s aggressive claim of inher-
ent executive authority to initiate a regime in which he could detain
indefinitely on mere suspicion.  Given this context, it was inevitable
that the statute be written as a broad delegation of the authority to
suspend.  Lincoln’s unilateral orders were still in effect when the stat-
ute was enacted, and even those congressmen protective of legislative
power in this area were careful to avoid the appearance of reprimand-
33 Other relevant Article I powers include Congress’s power to “raise and support
Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces,” and “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia.” U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
34 Prakash, supra note 13, at 611 (emphasis omitted).  There may be extreme circum- R
stances in which the President might be justified in detaining suspects in the absence of a
suspension.  If so, however, he would have to rely on a necessity defense or a later-passed
indemnity statute if a detainee later sued him for violating her civil liberties.  He could not,
as in the case of suspension, maintain that he had violated no law. See supra note 10 and R
infra note 281 and accompanying text. R
35 Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 23, at 84 R
(emphasis added).
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ing Lincoln while the nation was at war.  The statute was therefore
deliberately drafted so that it could be read either as authorizing Lin-
coln to act or approving what he had already done.36  The only lan-
guage in which that could be accomplished was the language of
delegation—and an extraordinarily broad one at that.37
This delegation model was a significant departure from the his-
tory that has otherwise influenced our approach to suspension under
the U.S. Constitution: parliamentary practice during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and state practice in the late eighteenth cen-
tury.  Neither Parliament nor early state legislatures assigned the king
or governor the task of determining whether the time was ripe for the
exercise of his emergency power.  The legislature itself made that
judgment and when it concluded that suspension was necessary, di-
rectly authorized the king or governor to detain those he deemed
dangerous.  These statutes, moreover, typically cabined the executive
authority by including a sunset clause and giving only high-ranking
officials the authority to detain.  The 1863 Act, by contrast, allowed
the President not only to decide when suspension was warranted but
also to define the scope of his own power.  He could subdelegate both
the suspension decision and the detention power to inferior officers,
and because the statute contained no sunset clause, the suspension of
basic criminal process rights continued for as long as he deemed it
necessary.
Lincoln may have lost his argument that the President possesses
inherent authority to suspend, but his battle with Congress yielded a
model that greatly enlarged the Executive’s traditional role in the sus-
pension decision.  The 1863 Act has been an influential legislative pre-
cedent.  Expressly invoking its example, Congress in 1871 empowered
Ulysses S. Grant to suspend the writ of habeas corpus as part of his
effort to suppress the Ku Klux Klan.38  In the twentieth century, Con-
gress delegated to territorial governors and the President the author-
ity to suspend the writ in five American territories.39  The territorial
delegations were particularly sweeping insofar as they were passed en-
tirely independently of any event that might have justified suspension.
The statute justifying suspension in the Philippines was enacted three
years before the administration of Theodore Roosevelt invoked it,40
and the statute that Franklin Delano Roosevelt invoked to suspend the
36 See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. R
37 See infra note 80 and accompanying text. R
38 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 483 (1871) (statement of Rep. Wilson)
(characterizing the 1871 Act as following the “distinguished precedent” of the 1863 Act
insofar as it delegated to the President the authority to suspend).
39 See infra Part II.C.4.
40 See infra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. R
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writ in Hawaii during World War II was enacted forty-one years before
the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.41
The “suspension by delegation” model presents a more nuanced
question than that posed by the starker “President versus Congress”
debate.  On the one hand, the modern nondelegation doctrine im-
poses few limits upon Congress’s ability to shift policymaking discre-
tion to the Executive.  The 1863 Act and its successors may well be
consistent with this vein of authority.  On the other hand, our tradi-
tion has placed particular emphasis on the importance of the Consti-
tution’s choice to give this emergency power to Congress.  Delegating
too much discretion to the Executive risks undermining the structural
protections built into this design.
The ensuing Parts consider how well the “suspension by delega-
tion” model fits into the constitutional structure.  It is worth keeping
in mind that even if suspension is a political question,42 the constitu-
tionality of delegation in this context is not likely immune from judi-
cial review.  During the Civil War, courts willingly reviewed both
Lincoln’s assertion of inherent executive authority to suspend43 and
the constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of that authority to
him.44  Courts might be ill-equipped to review political-branch judg-
ments about the existence of a rebellion, an invasion, and the threat
to the public safety, but analyzing the Constitution’s distribution of
responsibility between branches is a traditional judicial task.
II
OUR HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH EMERGENCY POWER
Parliament and founding-era state legislatures accomplished sus-
pensions outright rather than by delegation.  As Sections A and B of
this Part recount, the legislature decided that current circumstances
rendered suspension necessary and authorized the king or governor,
effective immediately, to detain anyone suspected of posing a threat to
the public safety.  The imprisonment of a suspect pursuant to any of
these statutes, then, was the result of two public safety determinations:
the legislature determined that the situation was dangerous enough to
require suspension, and the king or governor decided which persons
to detain in order to protect the public safety.  The executive thus had
significant discretion at the second step but very little discretion in
making the initial decision that he should be vested with emergency
power.  Beginning in the Civil War, the United States Congress gave
41 See infra notes 168–69 and accompanying text. R
42 See Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 351–62
(2006) (describing the conventional view that the decision to suspend is nonjusticiable).
43 See supra note 13. R
44 See infra notes 111–17 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 16 10-JAN-14 11:01
266 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:251
the President the responsibility for making both public safety determi-
nations: it charged him with deciding not only whom to arrest, but
also whether the overall threat to public safety justified his possession
of emergency power in the first place.  In all but one instance, Con-
gress also gave the President the authority to decide whether the req-
uisite “invasion or rebellion” had occurred.  Section C describes these
statutes, the vehement objections their delegation model generated,
and the scope of the executive orders they yielded.
A. Parliamentary Practice in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries
When Parliament suspended the writ during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, it did so outright by legislative enactment rather
than by granting suspension authority to the king.45  Accordingly,
each suspension responded to a current security crisis.  Consistent
with the view that suspension authorizes detention upon mere suspi-
cion rather than simply removing a judicially enforceable remedy,
these statutes directly “empower[ed] His Majesty to apprehend and
detain such Persons, as he shall find Cause to suspect are conspiring
against His Royal Person and Government.”46  The acts reflected Par-
liament’s judgment that a threat to public security made expansion of
the king’s detention power necessary47 and left the king to decide
whom to detain.
45 For a comprehensive list of seventeenth and eighteenth century English suspension
statutes, see Halliday & White, supra note 16, at 617 n.116.  English suspension practice R
greatly influenced the American practice. See id. at 580–81 (“The Supreme Court . . . has
consistently maintained that the contemporary constitutional jurisprudence of habeas
corpus needs to be informed by the legal and constitutional history of the ‘Great Writ,’
both in England and in the framing period of the Constitution.”).  That said, it must be
considered advisedly given the differences between English and American governmental
structure.
46 Id. at 618 (describing language in English statutes passed prior to the Revolution-
ary War).  The Revolutionary War suspension, enacted in 1777 and renewed five times, see
id. at 617 n.116, 645 n.207, is similarly entitled “An act to impower [sic] his Majesty to
secure and detain persons charged with, or suspected of, the crime of high treason . . . .”
See 17 Geo. 3 c. 9 (1777).
47 Halliday and White explain that “necessity” was the “principal justification for sus-
pen[sion,]” and “[t]he necessity rationale operated when, in Parliament’s estimation, the
subjects’ liberties could only be protected by temporary, carefully contained limits on a
writ that had come to be associated with those liberties.” Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
Parliament watered down the necessity standard during the Revolutionary War by justifying
suspension with reference to the “inconven[ience]” of trying colonists for treason “forth-
with” and the “evil example” of permitting them to remain at large. Id. at 645 (quoting 17
Geo. 3, c. 9).  Americans resented the Revolutionary War suspensions, and their ratifica-
tion of a constitutional provision limiting suspension to “when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it” adopted “suspension usage in England between
1689 and 1747, while rejecting the novel terms of suspension that Americans endured
starting in 1777.” PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 253
(2010).
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Paul Halliday and G. Edward White group the parliamentary sus-
pensions into two groups: those enacted between 1689 and 1747, and
those enacted during the Revolutionary War.48  They describe those
in the former group as having a “formulaic quality.”49  All specified
who could be imprisoned: those suspected of treason or “treasonable
practices.”50  All provided that only “specific officials—six members of
the Privy Council and eventually either of the two secretaries of
state—could exercise the suspension power to imprison without re-
view by the judiciary.”51  And all ran for a fixed period: some for as
little as one month and only one for more than a year.52  The Revolu-
tionary War suspension, enacted in 1777 and renewed five times, fol-
lowed this formula with the exception of the requirement that only
high-ranking officials could exercise the authority to detain.53  That
statute, which was controversial in both England and America,54 per-
mitted detention by “any magistrate having competent authority.”55
As we will see, the early state statutes closely tracked the tradi-
tional English formula, but beginning with the Civil War suspension,
federal suspension statutes departed in significant respects from it.
They delegated the suspension decision to the Executive, they did not
always have finite duration, they did not always specify the category of
people subject to the detention power, and they did not limit the offi-
cials who could exercise the detention power.
48 There are twelve statutes in the former group and six in the latter. See Halliday &
White, supra note 16, at 617 n.116. R
49 Id. at 617, 644–45.
50 See id. at 618–19.
51 Id. at 619.
52 See id. at 617 n.116.  Note that while all but one suspension statute ran for one year
or less, suspensions were often renewed upon their expiration. See id.
53 Like the earlier acts, they specified who could be imprisoned, see id. at 644, and
contained sunset clauses, see id. at 617 n.116, 645 n.207.
54 Many criticized the statute for deviating from the traditional “necessity” justifica-
tion. See supra note 47.  They also objected to the fact that it drew distinctions between R
subjects.  Unlike past suspensions, it rendered access to the privilege dependent upon the
place of capture.  Only those taken in America or on the high seas for treason or piracy
could be preventatively and indefinitely detained; the privilege remained intact in En-
gland. See infra note 308.  For a description of the controversy surrounding the 1777 Act, R
see Halliday & White, supra note 16, at 646–51 and HALLIDAY, supra note 47, at 252. R
55 17 Geo. 3, c. 9.
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B. Early State Practice
Several states passed legislation suspending the writ of habeas
corpus during the Revolutionary War.56  Massachusetts,57 Penn-
sylvania,58 Maryland,59 South Carolina,60 and Virginia61 each sus-
pended the writ, and with the exception of the Maryland legislation,
these statutes followed the traditional English pattern.  Each sus-
pended the writ outright rather than delegating the suspension deci-
sion to the governor.  Each contained a sunset provision.62  Each
56 See Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1920–21 (2009)
(discussing the Maryland statute); Tyler, supra note 2, at 622–27 (gathering statutes from R
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia).  New Jersey also suspended the
writ, see Tyler, supra note 2, at 623 n.102, but its statute is distinguishable from the others R
discussed in this section insofar as it did not authorize preventative detention.  The New
Jersey act made it a crime to, among other things, cross enemy lines without a license to do
so. See Act of Dec. 22, 1780, ch. 5, § 1, 1781 N.J. Laws 11, 12 (identifying this and other
means of abetting the enemy as grounds for being “legally convicted on Indictment before
any Court of Justice holding Jurisdiction in criminal Causes”).  Section 9 of the New Jersey
act then provided that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended for any
person jailed pursuant to a warrant “setting forth that the Prisoner was apprehended for”
committing one of the crimes specified in section 1. Id. ch. 5, § 9, at 15.
57 Act of May 9, 1777, ch. 45, reprinted in 5 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRI-
VATE, OF THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 641 (Boston, Wright & Potter Printing
Co. 1886).  Its preface noted the legislature’s finding that “the Public Enemy have [sic]
actually invaded some of our neighbouring States, and threaten an Invasion of this State,
the Safety of the Common-Wealth requires that a Power somewhere be lodged to appre-
hend and imprison any Persons whose Enlargement is dangerous to the Community.” Id.
at 641.
58 Act of Sept. 6, 1777, ch. 762, 1777 Pa. Laws 138.  The preface of the statute con-
tained two notable findings.  First, the General Assembly noted that “the preservation of
this state . . . at the time of an . . . invasion may require the immediate interposition of the
supreme executive council when the judicial powers of the government cannot in the ordi-
nary course of the law sufficiently provide for its security.” Id.  Second, it noted that “for
this important purpose the supreme executive council of this commonwealth have lately at
the recommendation of Congress taken up several [dangerous] persons[,] . . . and it is
apprehended that there are still more such persons among us, who cannot at this juncture
be safely trusted with their freedom without giving proper security to the public.” Id. at
138–39.
59 Act of Apr. 20, 1777, ch. 20, § 12, 1777 Md. Laws 19, 21.
60 Act of Oct. 17, 1778, No. 1109, S.C. Stat. 458 (1833), reprinted in 4 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 458–59 (Thomas Cooper ed. 1838).  The statute’s preface ex-
plained that “it is necessary in this time of  public danger, when this State is threatened
with an invasion by the enemy, that the hands of the executive should be strengthened.”
Id.
61 Act of May 1781, ch. 7 reprinted in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR
1619, at 413–16 (William W. Hening ed., 1822).  The preface explained that the measure
was necessary “in this time of public danger.” Id.  The statute made no mention of
invasion.
62 The Massachusetts statute expired one year after its effective date. See Act of May 9,
1777, ch. 45.  The Pennsylvania legislation remained in force until the “first sitting of the
next general assembly of the commonwealth and no longer.”  Act of Sept. 6, 1777, ch. 762,
§ 3. The Virginia statute similarly lasted “until the end of the next session of assembly, and
no longer.”  Act of May 1781, ch. 7.  The South Carolina statute “continue[d] in force until
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specified who could be detained.63  And each of these statutes vested
the authority to decide whom to preventatively detain in a high-rank-
ing executive official who could not delegate that discretion to sheriffs
or other subordinates.64  Any warrant had to be signed by one or more
of the high-ranking officials identified in the statute.  None of these
statutes, including Maryland’s, contained a geographic limitation, al-
though the authority necessarily existed only within the state’s
borders.
The Maryland legislation varied slightly from this pattern.  It had
no sunset provision, and unlike the suspension legislation in other
states, it did not take immediate effect.  It authorized preventative ar-
rests “in case this state shall be invaded by the enemy,” which required
the governor to make the predicate determination of when said “inva-
sion” occurred.65  But the fact of invasion did not trigger executive
authority to decide whether to suspend; suspension followed automat-
ically.  In other words, the governor was not left to decide whether the
ensuing threat to public safety warranted his assumption of emer-
gency power.  He had only to decide whether the exercise of that
power was warranted in any individual case.  It is noteworthy that in
Maryland, as elsewhere, the authority to dispense with due process in
any individual case was given only to high-ranking officials.  Once the
British were in Maryland, “the governor and council” could arrest or
order the arrest of “all persons whose going at large the governor and
council shall have good grounds to believe may be dangerous to the
safety of this state”66
ten days next after the meeting and sitting of the next General Assembly, and no longer.”
Act of Oct. 17, 1778, at 459.
63 The Pennsylvania and Virginia acts referred specifically to those suspected of trea-
sonous activity. See supra notes 58–61.  The Massachusetts, Maryland, and South Carolina R
acts defined the class of the detainable much more broadly, as anyone dangerous to the
state. See supra notes 57, 60. R
64 The Massachusetts act provided that “the Council may from Time to Time issue
their Warrant . . . signed by the President of the Council for the Time being, and directed to any
Sheriff or Deputy Sheriff within this State, or to any other person by Name, to command
and cause to be apprehended and Committed to any [jail] . . . any Person” who the Coun-
cil judged to be a threat to public safety. See Act of May 9, 1777, ch. 45. (emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania act provided that only “the president or vice-president and the members
of the supreme executive council of this state or any two of them” could direct an arrest.
Act of Sept. 6, 1777, ch. 762, § 1.  The Virginia statute authorized “[t]he governor, with the
advice of council” to arrest those “whom they may have just cause to suspect.”  Act of May
1781, ch. 7.  The South Carolina statute authorized the “President or Commander-in-
chief[,] . . . by and with the advice and consent of the Privy Council, by warrant under his
hand and seal, to arrest” persons endangering public safety.  Act of Oct. 17, 1778, No. 1109
at 458.
65 Act of Apr. 20, 1777, ch. 20, § 12, 1777 Md. Laws 19, 21.
66 Id. (specifying that “during any invasion of this state by the enemy, the habeas corpus
act shall be suspended, as to all such persons arrested by the order of the governor and council.”
(second emphasis added)).
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At the time these Revolutionary War-era acts were passed, none of
these states had constitutions with clauses limiting the circumstances
in which the writ could be suspended.  Massachusetts was the first
state to include a suspension clause in its constitution.67  It enacted its
constitution in 1780 and suspended the writ two years later in re-
sponse to the Ely riots.68  The statute, which suspended the writ out-
right, empowered the governor, with the advice of the Council, “to
apprehend and secure in any [jail] in this Commonwealth without
Bail or Mainprize, any Person or Persons whose being at large may be
judged by His Excellency and the Council, to be Dangerous to the
Peace and Well-being of this or any of the United States.”69  Again, the
decision to preventatively detain any individual had to be made by the
governor himself (with the advice of the council) rather than by a
subordinate acting on the governor’s behalf.  The Act contained a
sunset provision.70  In 1786, the Massachusetts legislature again sus-
pended the writ outright, this time in response to Shay’s Rebellion.71
This legislation, like the earlier statutes, required the governor him-
self to sign the warrant for the arrest of any person deemed deserving
of detention under the statute.72  The Act expired roughly eight
months after its passage.73
C. Federal Suspensions
Congress has debated whether to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus on three occasions: in response to the Burr Conspiracy, the
Civil War, and Klan violence during Reconstruction.  On the latter
two occasions, it passed suspension legislation.  There have been two
other suspensions at the federal level: one in Hawaii after Pearl Har-
67 See Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States—1776–1865, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 243,
247 (1964); see also MASS CONST. pt. II, ch. VI, art. VII (providing that “the writ of habeas
corpus . . . shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon the most urgent and
pressing occasions, and for a limited time not exceeding twelve months”).
68 Act of June 27, 1782, ch. 2, 1782 Mass. Acts 6, 6–7.  For discussion of this suspen-
sion, see Tyler, supra note 2, at 624. R
69 Act of June 27, 1782, ch. 2, at 6–7.
70 It expired in six months.  After its expiration, it was renewed for another four
months. See Act of Feb. 5, 1783, ch. 1, 1783 Mass. Acts 207.
71 Act of Nov. 10, 1786, ch. 10, 1786 Mass. Acts 510.  For a discussion of this suspen-
sion, see Tyler, supra note 2, at 624–27. R
72 [T]he Governour, with the advice and consent of the Council, be, and
hereby is authorized and empowered, by warrant, under the seal of the
Commonwealth, by him subscribed, and directed to any Sheriff, Deputy-
Sheriff, or Constable, or any other person, by name, to command, and
cause to be apprehended, and committed to any [jail] . . . any person or
persons whatsoever, whom the Governour and Council shall deem the
safety of the Commonwealth requires should be restrained of their per-
sonal liberty . . . .
Act of Nov. 10, 1786, ch. 10, at 510.
73 The Act expired on July 1, 1787. Id.
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bor and one in the Philippines during a 1905 insurrection.  Congress
itself did not consider whether the exercise of emergency power was
warranted in either of these two instances.  Both of these suspensions
were initiated by territorial governors under the supervision of the
President, acting under statutory delegations of authority that Con-
gress enacted long before the provoking events.  Congress included
delegations of suspension authority in three other territorial stat-
utes—those of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands—but none
of these were ever invoked.  My research did not disclose a suspension
provision in any other statute governing a U.S. territory.
1. The Burr Conspiracy
The first congressional debate about whether to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus occurred in 1807, when the Jefferson Administration
asked Congress to suspend the writ in connection with the Burr Con-
spiracy.74  The Senate responded to this request on the same day with
a bill suspending the writ for three months as to “any person or per-
sons, charged on oath with treason, misprision of treason, or other
high crime or misdemeanor.”75  The bill authorized arrest by order of
the President, by anyone acting under his authority, and by the Chief
Executive Magistrate of any State or Territorial Government.  Permit-
ting arrests by someone other than the President and high-ranking
federal officers was a feature of the bill that Representative Dana
found “highly objectionable” and “without precedent.”76  Like other
suspension statutes of the time, it suspended the writ outright, provid-
ing that “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be, and the
same hereby is suspended.”77  The House voted overwhelmingly against
the bill three days later after a debate in which many representatives
questioned both whether the conspiracy amounted to a rebellion and
74 See WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 135 (1980).
75 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 402 (1807) (Joseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds., 1852).
Senator James Bayard, who cast the only dissenting vote, did not “think the public safety at
this time requires this measure.” WILLIAM PLUMER’S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 1803–07, at 587–88 (Everett S. Brown ed., 1923) (emphasis omit-
ted).  Interestingly, James Bayard was the first in a line of prominent opponents of suspen-
sion legislation.  His son, Senator James Asheton Bayard, Jr., was one of the most vocal
opponents of the Civil War suspension, see infra note 92 and accompanying text and notes R
95–97, and his grandson, Senator Thomas Francis Bayard, was a similarly strong opponent R
of the Reconstruction suspension, see infra note 141 and accompanying text. R
76 16 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 75, at 424 (“There is another principle, which R
appears to me highly objectionable.  It authorizes the arrest of persons, not merely by the
President, or other high officers, but by any person acting under him.  I imagine this to be
wholly without precedent.  If treason was marching to force us from our seats, I would not
agree to do this.”).
77 Id. at 402 (second emphasis added); see also DUKER, supra note 74, at 136 (“Note, R
the suspension bill did not seek to delegate power to suspend to the President, but pro-
vided directly for that suspension.”).
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whether the threat to public safety warranted such an extreme
measure.78
2. The Civil War
The Habeas Corpus Act of March 3, 1863, is the first federal sus-
pension statute.79  It provides in relevant part “[t]hat, during the pre-
sent rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever, in his
judgment, the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the
United States, or any part thereof.”80  Thus, while Congress deter-
mined the existence of a rebellion for itself (a point on which there
was no dispute), it empowered the President to decide whether, for
how long, and where the public safety required suspension.  This
stands in contrast to earlier parliamentary and state suspension stat-
utes in which the legislature not only made the public safety determi-
nation but also specified the duration of the emergency power.81  The
78 The House refused the Senate’s request that it too conduct its deliberations in
secret and instead “threw open its doors and on the first reading rejected the bill 113–19.”
DUKER, supra note 74, at 137; see also 16 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 75, at 424 (recording R
that the bill was rejected by a vote of 113–19).  Many were skeptical that Burr led a rebel-
lion within the meaning of the Suspension Clause. See, e.g., id. at 414 (statement of Rep.
Varnum) (“I think it does not deserve the name of a rebellion; it is a little, petty, trifling,
contemptible thing, led on by a desperate man, at the head of a few desperate followers
. . . .”); id. at 419 (statement of Rep. Randolph) (characterizing affair as “nothing more nor
less than an intrigue”); id. at 422 (statement of Rep. Smilie) (“I really doubt whether either
[a rebellion or sufficient threat to public safety] exist.”).  Even among those who accepted
the existence of a rebellion, many were skeptical that the public safety was sufficiently
endangered. See, e.g., id. at 406 (statement of Rep. Burwell) (asserting that the supposed
rebellion was “not accompanied with such symptoms of calamity as rendered the passage of
the bill expedient”); id. at 406–07 (statement of Rep. Elliot) (insisting that the writ cannot
be suspended “in any and every case of invasion and rebellion,” but only “with a view to
national self-preservation,” a situation he did not believe existed here); id. at 411 (state-
ment of Rep. Eppes) (“I cannot, however[,] bring myself to believe that this country is
placed in such a dreadful situation as to authorize me to suspend the personal rights of the
citizen, and to give him, in lieu of a free Constitution, the Executive will for his charter.”).
79 The Confederate Congress enacted a series of suspension statutes during the Civil
War, the first several of which authorized the President of the Confederate States to sus-
pend the privilege of the writ.  Delegation of suspension authority was as controversial in
the Confederacy as it was in the United States. See David P. Currie, Through the
Looking-Glass: The Confederate Constitution in Congress, 1861–1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257,
1327–33 (2004) (describing the controversy).  In response to criticism of the delegation
model, the Confederate Congress ultimately abandoned it and suspended the writ out-
right. See id. at 1331.
80 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755.
81 See supra Part II.B.  The Maryland statute was the exception insofar as it lacked a
sunset provision. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  Note that the 1863 Act also R
differs from the bill passed by the Senate during the Burr Conspiracy.  While that bill
contained no geographic limitation, it expired after three months and applied only to
those suspected of crimes related to treason. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. R
The 1863 Act, by contrast, was not only open-ended but also permitted detention in “any
case.” See supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
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absence of any limitation on the officials who could exercise the emer-
gency detention power was also a contrast to prior statutes.  Histori-
cally, only specific, high-ranking officials could make arrests; the 1863
Act permitted anyone acting under Lincoln’s authority to do so.
While the statute provided little limit on the President’s power to
suspend the writ, it did contain a significant restriction on his power
to detain once the emergency power was activated.  Section 2 of the
Act required the Secretaries of State and War to provide federal
judges with a list of all prisoners who were “citizens of states in which
the administration of the laws has continued unimpaired in the said
Federal courts.”82  These lists limited the detention authority as
follows:
[If] a grand jury, having attended any of said courts having jurisdic-
tion in the premises . . . after the furnishing of said list . . . has
terminated its session without finding an indictment or present-
ment . . . it shall be the duty of the judge of said court forthwith to
make an order that any such prisoner desiring a discharge from said
imprisonment be brought before him to be discharged.83
Those officers of the United States who refused to “immediately . . .
obey and execute” such orders were subject to fine and imprison-
ment.84  As it happened, however, section 2 had little practical effect;
the Lincoln Administration blatantly ignored the provision despite re-
peated congressional entreaties that it comply.85
Given Lincoln’s multiple, unilateral suspensions of the writ
before 1863, it was inevitable that Congress would structure the 1863
Act as a delegation.  These suspensions were extremely controversial,
and there had been a years-long, heated debate about whether Lin-
coln had acted unconstitutionally.86  The statute was drafted carefully
to gloss over that controversy so that both supporters and opponents
of Lincoln’s pre-statute proclamations could vote for it.87  As Senator
Doolittle explained:
[T]hose persons who conscientiously maintain that under the Con-
stitution the President is clothed with power without any legislation
of Congress, can vote for this section upon the ground that this sec-
tion is merely declaratory of a power which inheres in him under
82 § 2, 12 Stat. 755. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Tyler, supra note 2, at 651–52 nn.246–50 and accompanying text (detailing the R
Lincoln administration’s failure to comply with section 2 of the 1863 Act).
86 See generally George Clarke Sellery, Lincoln’s Suspension of Habeas Corpus as Viewed by
Congress, 1 BULL. U. OF WIS. 213 (1907) (providing an account of this debate).
87 See FARBER, supra note 13, at 159 (explaining that the statutory language was delib- R
erately “ambiguous about whether Congress was conferring the power to suspend the writ
or merely recognizing its existence in the hands of the president”).
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the Constitution itself; and those who maintain that it is to be de-
rived from an act of Congress can sustain this section upon the
ground that it is an enacting clause which gives him the power.88
Had the statute suspended the writ outright, it could not have been
interpreted as “merely declaratory of a power which inheres in him
under the Constitution itself.”89  On the contrary, a straightforward
assertion of legislative power would have strongly implied that Con-
gress believed the President’s earlier proclamations to be unlawful.  If
language susceptible of both interpretations was necessary for the stat-
ute’s passage, it is difficult to imagine how that could have been ac-
complished in language other than that of delegation.
That said, structuring the statute as a delegation was controver-
sial.90  Throughout the debates, critics repeatedly argued that the mo-
mentous decision to suspend was one committed exclusively to
legislative discretion.91  Senator Bayard’s argument is representative:
[I]f there ever was a case to which the delegatus non potest delegari
applied, it is precisely this case with those who believe that in Con-
gress is vested the sole power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus . . . .  The decision as to the public safety, the extent to which
the right is to run, the duration of time during which the suspen-
sion is to last, are all matters for legislation, and legislation alone,
and you have no authority to delegate your legislative powers to the
Executive of the United States.92
88 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1092 (1863).
89 See id.
90 Objections to delegation were voiced primarily by those who thought that the sus-
pension power was legislative.  Some who thought that the power was executive, however,
also spoke against it.  For example, Senator Lane argued that if the power was, as he be-
lieved, an executive one, the statute was “an improper interference with the duties and
powers of the executive office.” Id. at 157.  And if Congress possessed the power, as his
opponents claimed, he asserted that it would be “clearly unconstitutional” for Congress “to
bestow [that power] upon another department.” Id.; see also id. at 216 (statement of Sen.
Field) (“I hold that the Constitution of the United States confers upon the President, and
not upon Congress, the power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; but if
mistaken in this, I hold that Congress has no authority to delegate to the President the
exercise of such a power.”).
91 There were three suspension bills introduced in the 37th Congress: S. 33, H.R. 362,
and H.R. 591. See Sellery, supra note 86, at 231–63.  All three bills delegated suspension R
authority to the Executive.  S. 33 was short-lived. See id. at 231–34, 239 n.1 (explaining that
the bill died two weeks after its introduction in the first session, and that the Judiciary
Committee recommended its indefinite postponement in the second).  H.R. 362 and H.R.
591 passed both houses, and the Habeas Corpus Act, while formally passed as H.R. 591, was
a fusion of the Senate version of both bills. Id. at 261–63.  Because H.R. 362 and H.R. 591
are the bills that contributed to the Habeas Corpus Act, this section will focus on them.
The debate about delegation was the same with respect to each; thus, for simplicity’s sake,
this section will not, as a rule, specify the bill to which a comment about delegation was
addressed.
92 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1094 (1863); see also id. at 111 (statement of
Sen. Powell) (“I do not believe that we have the right to delegate to any person the power
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.”); id. at 1204 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (arguing
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In other words, the “public safety” prong of the Suspension Clause
required Congress, as guardian of the emergency power, to judge
whether, where, and for how long the privilege of the writ should be
withdrawn.  The bill abdicated this responsibility by leaving these mat-
ters entirely to the President’s judgment.  Indeed, the legislation was
so broadly drawn that it permitted the President to impose a nation-
wide suspension of unlimited duration if he saw fit to do so.93  Some
argued that there was little difference between this bill and “that polit-
ical heresy that the right to suspend the writ exists in the President of
the United States, and not in Congress.”94  Bayard and others com-
plained that the bill concentrated too much power in the hands of the
Executive.95  While the power to arrest belonged to the President, the
power to suspend belonged to the legislature; giving both to the Presi-
dent created the risk of abuse that the separation of powers was de-
signed to minimize.96  Those advancing this argument insisted that
they were not accusing Lincoln of readiness to abuse the authority but
rather resisting the delegation of such sweeping power to any man.97
As Senator Powell asserted:
I would not confer it on any man, I care not how great, how good,
how wise, how virtuous he may be, and I do not concede that those
who are the real and true friends of constitutional and civil liberty
ever will part with this power.  They should exercise it themselves.98
Powell and others invoked history in support of their position, point-
ing out that Parliament had never given suspension authority to the
that H.R. 362 was unconstitutional because “it proposes to delegate [the suspension]
power to the President of the United States”).  On December 22, 1862, thirty-six members
of the House—a substantial minority—submitted a protest against H.R. 591, challenging,
among other things, the constitutionality of the delegation.  The protest was tabled by a
vote of 75–41. See id. at 165–66.
93 The potential for such a sweeping suspension was a feature that opponents of the
suspension legislation found particularly offensive. See infra note 109 and accompanying R
text.
94 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1462 (1863) (statement of Sen. Wall); see also id.
at 1195 (statement of Sen. Carlile) (characterizing delegation as a variant of the argument
that the “the power to suspend this writ [is] in the Executive of the United States”).
95 Senator Bayard argued the Executive ought not decide whether the primary safe-
guard against abuse of executive discretion should be removed.  He characterized the writ
“as the sole security of every citizen of the United States against executive oppression” and
asserted that “[w]hether the oppression is intended or not is not the question.” Id. at 1094;
see also id. at 111 (statement of Sen. Powell) (“I do not think a more dangerous power
[than the ability to suspend the writ nationwide] could be committed to the hands of an
Executive.”).
96 Id. at 1095 (statement of Sen. Bayard) (arguing that the legislation “merges the
legislative and executive power in one”).
97 See, e.g., id. at 1094 (statement of Sen. Bayard) (“Now, sir, it is not a question of
whether the President will abuse the power you so delegate . . . .  The precedent is such
that it gives a power which I would yield to no man . . . .”).
98 Id. at 1192.
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Crown but had rather authorized the Crown to arrest and detain for
some limited period of time—typically one year.99
Defenders of delegation viewed the blending of legislative and
executive power in the suspension decision as a virtue, for neither
Congress nor the President alone suspended the writ.  Instead, “the
united power of both” was brought to bear.100  They also claimed that
delegation of the suspension power was no different than the many
other instances in which Congress transfers responsibility to the Exec-
utive.  When asked why it is constitutional for Congress to grant this
power to the President, Representative Bingham responded: “I say
that this form of legislation is not new, that our statute-books abound
in precedents of this sort, which leave the exercise of a discretion in
the Executive of the United States . . . .”101  Senator Trumbull argued
that authorizing the Executive to suspend was no different than au-
thorizing him to grant letters of marque and reprisal or to call out the
militia, both of which Congress had done.102  The latter case, in par-
ticular, involved a similar judgment insofar as the President’s statutory
authority was triggered by his determination that an insurrection exis-
ted.103  Moreover, supporters claimed, treating suspension as delega-
ble made sense.  Assessing the public safety “would be practicable and
easy” for the President but “would be impracticable” for Congress.104
“In the ever-changing circumstances which grow out of a war, and a
gigantic war like this,” Senator Doolittle argued, “who can judge two
months or six months beforehand the places where it will be necessary
that this writ shall be suspended?”105  These arguments did not per-
suade critics of the bill, who remained firm in the belief that suspen-
99 See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. Powell) (“[I]t has been the immemorial practice of
Parliament to prescribe the time during which and the localities in which it shall be sus-
pended.  They perform the whole function themselves.  They leave nothing to the execu-
tive, except to see that the law is executed.”); id. at 1094 (statement of Sen. Bayard)
(pointing out that Parliament suspended directly rather than authorizing the king to do
it).
100 Id. at 1194 (statement of Sen. Doolittle).
101 Id. at 1192; see also id. at 1185 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“[Y]ou could not carry
on this Government a day unless the powers which are vested in Congress could be exer-
cised and carried out by instrumentalities other than Congress itself.”).
102 Id. at 1185.
103 Id.; see also id. at 1194 (statement of Sen. Doolittle) (invoking the Calling Forth Act
as authority for the proposition that Congress can “delegate to the President the power to
judge of the exigency upon which the exercise of [the suspension] power shall depend”).
Senator Carlile, an opponent of delegation, conceded that Congress could identify a
“given and fixed” event that would enable the President to declare war but argued that the
determination of where and when the threat to public safety warranted suspension was one
Congress alone could make. Id. at 1187.
104 Id. at 1188 (statement of Sen. Howard).  He pointed out that the Executive, unlike
Congress, is never in recess.  Moreover, it is possible for the writ to be suspended only as to
designated individuals or localities, and it is impractical for Congress to legislate at that
level of specificity. Id.
105 Id. at 1194.
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sion was distinguishable from the analogies that the bill’s supporters
invoked.  Issuing letters of marque and reprisal, calling out the militia,
and declaring war were “war measures,” Senator Powell insisted, and
“there is a marked difference . . . between authorizing the President
[to take a war measure], and authorizing him to suspend the func-
tions of a great remedial civil writ.”106
It is noteworthy that the pro- and antidelegation camps disagreed
not only on the question of delegation but also on the scope of the
Suspension Clause itself.  Those opposed to delegation generally took
a narrow view of the Clause.  For them, a rebellion in one part of the
country did not justify suspension in another, nor did a threat to pub-
lic safety in one location justify suspension in regions beyond it.107
The Clause permitted the writ to be suspended only so far as is neces-
sary, and Senator Bayard and his allies did not expect the President to
make fine-tuned judgments in that regard.  They knew that the sus-
pension would have no geographic or temporal limits unless Congress
imposed them.  Senator Trumbull and his allies, by contrast, took a
broader view of the Clause.108  Tellingly, they did not defend delega-
tion on the ground that the President was likely to suspend with the
precision that Bayard and others thought the Clause required; on the
contrary, they were comfortable on both constitutional and policy
grounds with the prospect of a nationwide suspension.  The stakes of
106 Id. at 1192 (“One is military, purely military; the other is civil.”).  This distinction
echoes one drawn in the case law.  In areas in which the President possesses inherent
authority—like his authority as Commander in Chief—the Court has allowed particularly
broad delegations. See infra notes 213 and 286.  The fact that Congress may delegate par- R
ticularly broad authority to the President with respect to the conduct of war, then, does not
necessarily support the argument that it may do so with respect to the decision to revoke
civil rights.
107 See, e.g., id. at 1104 (statement of Rep. Wickliffe) (arguing that insurrection in one
part of the country does not justify suspension in another); id. at 1094 (statement of Sen.
Bayard) (insisting that a suspension statute “must . . . describe where and in what part of
the country, in your solemn judgment, the public safety requires that this writ should be
suspended.”); id. at 1187 (statement of Sen. Carlile) (“It cannot and it will not be con-
tended that an invasion or rebellion existing in a particular section of the country would
authorize an entire suspension of this writ all over that portion of the country where there
was no rebellion or invasion, and where the public safety was not threatened.”); id. at 1199
(statement of Sen. Henderson) (objecting to suspension in loyal states); id. at 1204 (state-
ment of Sen. Saulsbury) (objecting that the Constitution did not permit suspension in
states unaffected by the rebellion).  Some appeared to characterize this as a prudential
rather than constitutional constraint on the exercise of the power. See, e.g., id. at 111
(statement of Sen. Powell) (“[I]f it should be necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,
I trust [Congress] will exercise the power with circumspection, and only cause it to be
suspended in certain States and in certain localities where it becomes necessary that it
should be suspended, and not throughout the whole country.”).
108 Id. at 1185 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“It is entirely competent for Congress to
authorize the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during this rebellion through-
out the United States.”).
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delegating the suspension decision to the President, therefore, were
considerably lower for them.
On September 15, 1863, six months after Congress passed the
Act, Lincoln suspended the writ nationwide as to a broad class of pris-
oners.109  This order did not dramatically change the status quo, for
many of those to whom it applied were already subject to detention
under earlier suspensions that Lincoln had instigated without Con-
gress’s permission.110
Those earlier orders had provoked challenge, most famously in
Ex parte Merryman, on the ground that the power to suspend belonged
exclusively to Congress.111  The new orders provoked challenge on
the ground that Congress could not delegate that power.  In In re Oli-
ver, the Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged the general proposi-
tion that the legislature has broad authority to delegate policymaking
authority to the other branches of government.112  Nonetheless, the
court opined, suspension is different: “[T]he power to determine
whether the emergency has arrived, when, under the constitution, the
privilege may be suspended, seems one of those essential trusts con-
fided to the legislature which cannot be delegated.”113  Indeed, the
court found the language in the 1863 Act so broad that it could be
interpreted as “an attempt to transfer bodily to the [P]resident the
entire legislative function upon this subject.”114  The court avoided its
serious doubts about the statute’s constitutionality by interpreting the
statute as “an expression of the legislative judgment that the time has
already arrived when the public safety requires the legislature to pro-
vide for a suspension.”115  In other words, it interpreted the statute as
an outright suspension that left the President to execute the law by
109 8 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3372 (James D.
Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
110 I say “instigated” because Lincoln did not himself suspend the writ in all of the
pre-1863 orders.  Most often, he delegated the suspension authority to his subordinates.
He authorized subordinate military commanders to suspend the writ between Philadelphia
and Washington on April 27, 1861, id. at 3219; along portions of the Florida coast on May
10, 1861, id. at 3217–18; as to one Major Chase on June 20, 1861, id. at 3220; between New
York and Washington on July 2, 1861, id. at 3220; between Bangor, Maine, and Washington
on October 14, 1861, id. at 3240; in Missouri on December 2, 1861, id. at 3300; and in
Baltimore on April 5, 1862, id. at 3313.  On at least three occasions, Lincoln suspended the
writ himself rather than authorizing a military commander to do so.  On November 11,
1861, he “direct[ed] that the writ of habeas corpus be suspended” as to U.S. military per-
sonnel and “marshals and their deputies within the State of New York.”  An order dated
August 8, 1862, “hereby suspended” the writ as to draft-dodgers. Id. at 3322.  Another
dated September 24, 1862, suspended it as to all the disloyal and their abettors. Id. at
3299–300.
111 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
112 17 Wis. 681, 682–84 (1864).
113 Id. at 685.
114 Id. at 685–86.
115 Id. at 682, 686.
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deciding whether to exercise the emergency power in any particular
case.116  In a different case, the Supreme Court of the District of Co-
lumbia agreed with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the statute
would almost surely be unconstitutional if it delegated suspension
power to the President.117  Rather than interpreting it as an outright
suspension, however, the District of Columbia court interpreted it as a
(proper, in its view) recognition of the President’s inherent authority
to suspend.118
Interestingly, both pre- and post-1863 cases expressed concern
not only about the division of power between the Legislative and Exec-
utive Branches but also about the President’s ability to redelegate sus-
pension power to his subordinates within the Executive Branch.  As
one court put it:
[E]ven if the [P]resident possessed the delicate and dangerous
power of suspending the writ of habeas corpus, it will hardly be
claimed that he could delegate it to all or any of his subordinates, to
be exercised when, in their discretion, the ‘public safety’ might re-
quire it, any more than he could delegate the veto power.119
Nor, once the writ was suspended, were courts comfortable with the
President broadly delegating emergency detention power to his subor-
dinates.  Recall that the state suspension statutes required detention
orders to be signed by a high-ranking executive official, either the gov-
ernor himself or a member of his council.120  The 1863 Act contained
no such limitation; instead, it authorized imprisonment “by order or
authority of the President of the United States or [the Secretaries of
State or War].”121  The Circuit Court in the District of California
observed:
If every officer in the United States, during the suspension of the
habeas corpus, is authorized to arrest and imprison whom he will, as
‘aiders and abettors of the enemy,’ without further orders from the
[P]resident, or those to whom he has specially committed such au-
116 See id.
117 In re Dugan, 6 D.C. 131, 137 (1865) (asserting that if the suspension power be-
longed to Congress, the Act would be “a perfect and complete abnegation of that power” if
Congress attempted to delegate the power to the President).
118 Id. at 146 (characterizing the statute as “enacted from ‘abundant caution’ to justify
such exercise of authority if, as claimed by some, the provision should be finally declared
to be a grant of legislative power”).
119 Ex parte Field, 9 F.Cas. 1, 5 (D. Vt. 1862); see also Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144,
148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (Taney, C.J.) (expressing surprise that the “[P]resident not only
claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, at his discretion, but to
delegate that discretionary power to a military officer”).
120 See supra Part II.B.
121 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755 (emphasis added).
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thority, the state of things that would follow can be better imagined
than expressed.122
Entrusting the President with the authority to suspend or the power to
detain was one thing; entrusting that power to every man in the field
was another.
While the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 did not delegate to the
President the question whether a rebellion existed at the time the stat-
ute was passed, it did leave him to determine when the rebellion en-
ded.123  President Andrew Johnson’s judgment in this regard is open
to question.124  Robert E. Lee surrendered at Appomattox on April 9,
1865,125 and the last Confederate army of any substance surrendered
on May 26 of that year.126  Yet Johnson did not fully revoke Lincoln’s
1863 order instituting a nationwide suspension until August 20,
1866.127  He thus left the suspension in place for more than a year
after fighting had ceased.  And while he did gradually narrow the
scope of the suspension over the course of that year, his orders in that
regard do not reflect a decision to target only those regions under
122 McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1247 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867); see also Ex parte Bene-
dict, 3 F. Cas. 159, 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (“Could it have been intended that military officers
of every grade, and policemen of every class, throughout the loyal states, acting upon their
own suspicions . . . should be authorized to arrest and imprison any citizen, without the
possibility of a judicial investigation?”); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1865)
(statement of Rep. Davis) (lamenting the fact that arrests under the act were not being
made by the President or heads of departments but by lieutenants, provost marshals, and
sometimes “by a person calling himself a provost marshal”); id. at 1373 (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) (“[W]hen I voted for that law, I did not expect that the writ of habeas corpus was
to be regarded as suspended by all the subordinate officers throughout the land.  I did not
suppose that every provost marshal in the land would be at liberty to arrest whom he
pleased, and keep him in confinement.”).
123 The statute permitted the President to suspend only “during the present rebel-
lion.”  Thus, by the terms of the statute, the President’s authority to exercise emergency
power ceased when the rebellion ceased.  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755.
124 Andrew Johnson became President after Abraham Lincoln was assassinated on
April 14, 1865. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 520–21 (3d ed. 2001).
125 Id. at 519.
126 Id. at 530.  The very last Confederate surrender of the war was the surrender of the
C.S.S. Shenandoah in England on November 6, 1865.  JOHN BALDWIN & RON POWERS, LAST
FLAG DOWN: THE EPIC JOURNEY OF THE LAST CONFEDERATE WARSHIP 315–20 (2007).
127 On June 13, 1865, he issued an order lifting certain restrictions on previously dis-
loyal states but emphasized that the nationwide suspension remained in place.  8 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 3516 (emphasizing that “nothing herein contained shall be R
considered or construed . . . as impairing existing regulations for the suspension of the
habeas corpus”).  On December 1, 1865, Johnson revoked the suspension everywhere except
“the States of Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, the District of Columbia,
and the Territories of New Mexico and Arizona.” Id. at 3531.  On April 2, 1866, he revoked
the suspension everywhere except Texas upon a finding that the insurrection was “at an
end” in those states. Id. at 3630.  He proclaimed the insurrection “completely and every-
where suppressed and ended . . . in the said State of Texas” and ended the suspension
there on August 20, 1866. Id. at 3635–36.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 31 10-JAN-14 11:01
2014] SUSPENSION AND DELEGATION 281
particular threat.  For example, Johnson deliberately left the suspen-
sion in place even in the northern states until December 1, 1865.128
Moreover, this December order—the first to narrow the suspension—
included Kentucky and Tennessee on a list of states singled out for
continued suspension despite the fact that Johnson had earlier de-
clared the insurrection successfully suppressed in both states.129
3. Reconstruction
The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 authorized the President to sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus in order to put down Klan uprisings in
the South.130  The Civil War statute had delegated to the President
only the authority to determine when the public safety required sus-
pension.  There was, of course, no dispute in that circumstance that a
rebellion was underway, and Congress said as much in the statute it-
self.  The Reconstruction statute, by contrast, required the President
to decide not only what the public safety demanded but also when a
rebellion existed—a question hotly debated in Congress.131  In tasking
the President with this decision, Congress laid down specific guide-
128 See supra note 127. R
129 The December order left the suspension intact in Tennessee, see supra note 127, R
despite the fact that Johnson’s order of June 13, 1865, specifically declared the insurrec-
tion suppressed in that state.  8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 3515 (“I am satis- R
factorily informed that dangerous combinations against the laws of the United States no
longer exist within the State of Tennessee; that the insurrection heretofore existing within
said State has been suppressed; that within the boundaries thereof the authority of the
United States is undisputed, and that such officers of the United States as have been duly
commissioned are in the undisturbed exercise of their official functions . . . .”).  Similarly,
Johnson declared on October 12, 1865, that “the danger of insurgent raids . . . has substan-
tially passed away” in Kentucky, id. at 3530, but Kentucky was also included in the list of
states that Johnson singled out for continued suspension in his December 1, 1865 order.
See supra note 127. R
130 See Tyler, supra note 2, at 655–62 (describing the context of this suspension). R
131 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 160 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Golladay) (“[F]or however the friends of this measure may insist, they can never convince
any sane man that a few outrages committed by bad men, and not sanctioned by law or the
community, constitute a rebellion.”); id. at 368 (statement of Rep. Sheldon) (“I have no
doubt of the existence of outrages in certain localities in the South, and of an aggravated
and, perhaps, of an alarming character; alarming because they forebode anarchical ten-
dencies, and a growing disposition to ignore and overturn social securities. . . .  But bad as
the condition is, or may have been, I have never believed, and do not now believe, that
there is any purpose on the part of the responsible and influential people of the South to
make another attempt to become independent of the Government of the United States.”);
id. at 373 (statement of Rep. Archer) (“This is magnifying individual quarrels, individual
trespasses to rebellion against the Government, although the parties concerned may have
had no idea, no desire to jeopardize the existence of the Government.”).  Notably, Senator
Lyman Trumbull, the architect of the 1863 suspension statute, was among those in the
42nd Congress who thought the statute authorized suspension in circumstances that fell
short of “rebellion.” See id. at 582 (urging the “impropriety of authorizing the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus because of the existence of an unlawful combination armed and
powerful, and that has done nothing whatever”).
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lines for determining what constituted a rebellion and concomitant
threat to public safety:
[W]henever in any State or part of a State the unlawful combina-
tions [of those who obstruct the execution of the law so as to de-
prive any class of people their civil rights] shall be organized and
armed, and so numerous and powerful as to be able, by violence, to
either overthrow or set at defiance the constituted authorities of
such State, and of the United States within such State, or when the
constituted authorities are in complicity with, or shall connive at the
unlawful purposes of, such powerful and armed combinations; and
whenever, by reason of either or all of the causes aforesaid, the con-
viction of such offenders and the preservation of the public safety
shall become in such a district impracticable, in every such case such
combinations shall be deemed a rebellion against the government of the
United States . . . .132
This ability to determine when violence escalated to the level of a re-
bellion was the only respect in which the 1871 Act was broader than
the 1863 Act.  In every other respect, the authority it conferred was
markedly narrower.  It was geographically limited: the President could
suspend the writ only “within the limits of the district which shall be so
under the sway thereof.”133  It was temporally limited: the authoriza-
tion expired “after the end of the next regular session of Congress.”134
It was also subject to conditions.  The President could suspend the
writ only if he first issued a proclamation “commanding such insur-
gents to disperse.”135  Furthermore, once a suspension was in effect,
detentions were subject to the same limitations imposed by the 1863
Act with respect to furnishing lists of prisoners to the courts and dis-
charging those who were not prisoners of war and whom the grand
jury did not indict.136
132 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis added).  This statute
bears some resemblance to the 1777 Maryland statute, which provided for suspension once
the governor determined that an “invasion” had occurred. See supra note 65 and accompa- R
nying text.  The difference between the two is that suspension automatically followed in
the Maryland case, while the Ku Klux Klan Act made suspension contingent upon the
President’s determination that the public safety required it.  Once the President deter-
mined that a rebellion existed, the Ku Klux Klan Act provided “that it shall be lawful for
the President of the United States, when in his judgment the public safety shall require it,
to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, to the end that such rebellion may
be overthrown.”  The different format of the 1871 Act is constitutionally significant.  Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, at § 4, 17 Stat. 15; see also infra Part III.
133 § 4, 17 Stat. at 15.
134 Id. Congress passed the Act on April 20, 1871, and the next session of Congress
ended on June 10, 1872, giving the Act a lifespan of almost fourteen months. See House
History, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://artandhistory
.house.gov/house_history/Session_Dates/40to59.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
135 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, §4, 17 Stat. 13.
136 Id.
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As it had during the Civil War, delegating suspension authority to
the President generated controversy.  Many of the arguments levied
against delegation echoed those made in the context of the 1863 Act,
which opponents of the current legislation characterized as bad prece-
dent that ought not be followed.137  Critics insisted that the Constitu-
tion required Congress to exercise its own judgment about what the
public safety required.138  They contended that concentrating the sus-
pension and detention powers in the hands of the Executive was both
dangerous and in violation of the separation of powers principle.139
And they pointed out that once the power was treated as delegable,
there was no reason why Congress could not give it to someone lower
ranked and perhaps less able than the President.140
137 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1871) (statement of Rep. Archer)
(insisting that the 1863 Act is a bad precedent because the suspension power cannot be
delegated); id. at 411 (statement of Rep. Van Trump) (arguing that the 1863 act was “abso-
lutely null and void” insofar as it delegated suspension power to the President).  Senator
Vickers made the same point in a debate about whether to extend the Ku Klux Klan Act.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3715 (1872) (“But I do not think that Congress even [in
1863] had any authority to invest the President with the power.”).
138 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 411 (1871) (statement of Rep. Van
Trump) (describing the public safety determination as a discretionary judgment that is
Congress’s alone to make); id. at 479 (statement of Rep. Leach) (“[I]f the legal principle
of delegatus non delegare holds good, as it does, where matters of even little importance are
involved, how much more so in that most delicate question and great inalienable right, the
liberty of the citizen?”); id. at app. 160 (statement of Rep. Golladay) (“But this bill, sir,
attempts to shirk the question [whether the exigency has arisen] and confer the power on
the President.  This cannot be done.”); id. at app. 222 (statement of Sen. Thurman) (as-
serting that the point of making the suspension power legislative is for Congress to judge
whether the grounds for suspension exist); id. at app. 260 (statement of Rep. Holman)
(arguing that the decision to suspend is entrusted to Congress alone, yet this bill “make[s]
the President of the United States the sole judge of the conditions on which these vast and
final powers of absolute government shall be assumed”).
139 See, e.g., id. at app. 260 (statement of Rep. Holman) (arguing that vesting the Presi-
dent with this power disturbed the Constitution’s finely wrought separation of powers); id.
at 399–400 (statement of Rep. Kinsella) (objecting to the danger of vesting one man, par-
ticularly one of military background, with the discretion to suspend habeas corpus); id. at
479 (statement of Rep. Leach) (“God never made any one man that I would trust with such
a high prerogative . . . .”).  Senator Hamilton made the same point in the debate about
whether to extend the suspension provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act. See CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3724 (1872) (asserting that he would clothe no man, not even George
Washington, with the power to suspend the writ); see id. at app. 510 (statement of Sen.
Stevenson) (“I tell the Senator that the pending proposition to invest the President with
the power of a Roman dictator over the liberty of the citizen is forbidden alike by law and
fact.  The Constitution forbids it, because it is an exclusive legislative trust, which Congress
cannot redelegate.”).
140 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 352 (1871) (statement of Rep. Beck)
(contending that “[i]f Congress can thus shift the responsibility, it can confer it on . . . the
General of the Army, or an executive committee sitting during recess, or on any man or set
of men it pleases, and the carefully guarded provisions of the Constitution may thus be set
at naught”).
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New, however, was the argument that even if the public safety
determination was delegable, the question whether a rebellion or an
invasion existed was not.  Senator Bayard protested:
[A rebellion] cannot be contemplated in advance. . . .  Now, Con-
gress not only has sought to delegate to the President of the United
States the exercise of a power confided to its discretion alone, but it
has gone further, and authorized him to suspend this writ of right
in a case where Congress itself has not the power constitutionally to
do it.141
In other words, an active rebellion or invasion had to exist in order to
justify any sort of suspension statute, including one that gave the Presi-
dent the authority to suspend when he judged it necessary for the
public safety.  Of course, not everyone saw the existence of an active
rebellion or invasion as an immoveable requirement.  Anticipating the
open-ended delegations Congress later enacted with respect to U.S.
territories, Representative Sheldon of Louisiana opined that Congress
had “the authority to place upon the statute-book a permanent law
empowering the President to suspend the privileges of the writ of
habeas corpus whenever in his judgment a case of rebellion or invasion
exists.”142  And here, the law was not so abstract as the one Represen-
tative Sheldon described.  It was tied to current events, and it gave the
President detailed guidelines to apply in determining whether the
contingency had come to pass.143  The bill’s supporters contended
141 Id. at 245; see also, e.g., id. at 367 (statement of Rep. Arthur) (objecting on the
ground that “Congress alone can rightfully suspend the privilege of [habeas corpus], and
only in time of rebellion or invasion” and “Congress cannot devolve it upon the capricious
will of the Executive, to do with as he may in contingencies”); id. at 479 (statement of Rep.
Leach) (arguing that Congress cannot authorize the President to decide when public
safety warrants suspension, much less to decide when “insurrection or war exists”); id. at
app. 754 (statement of Rep. Wood) (objecting that the President “is to be the sole and
exclusive judge of what constitutes a rebellion . . . .  He may construe the assembling of two
or more men in a bar-room fight as constituting that condition of things as under the bill
would justify him in assuming that that kind of ‘combination’ or conspiracy or rebellion
existed which warranted the full exercise of all the power granted”); id. at 352 (statement
of Rep. Beck) (“The people have a right to have the action of their Representatives, under
all their responsibilities, acting on the existing facts; and there is no warrant anywhere for
the transfer of that authority to the President to act on such facts as may arise hereafter
. . . .”).
142 Id. at 368.  He added that it would be “impolitic and dangerous” to do so. Id.
143 See, e.g., id. at 483 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (“[The bill] does not make the Presi-
dent the sole and exclusive judge of what constitutes a rebellion.  The bill specifies what
facts shall be deemed a rebellion, and allows the President to judge when those facts ex-
ist.”); id. at 698 (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (supporting delegation on the ground that
Congress “delegate[s] powers constantly; not legislative powers, but powers to act in a con-
tingency which the Legislature prescribes or provides for or defines in advance”).
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that Congress’s act of empowering the President served as the neces-
sary exercise of legislative authority.144
Six months went by before President Ulysses S. Grant exercised
the authority given him by the 1871 Act.  On October 17, 1871, Grant
suspended the writ in nine South Carolina counties after declaring
that a rebellion existed as defined by the statute and that “the public
safety especially requires that the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus
be suspended.”145  The 1871 Act, like the 1863 Act, did not restrict the
exercise of detention authority to high-ranking officials, and Grant
delegated it to a range of subordinates: the U.S. marshal, any of his
deputies, any federal military officer, and “any soldier or citizen acting
under the orders of said marshal, deputy, or such military officer
within any one of said counties.”146  Just over two weeks later, Grant
revoked the suspension in one county.147  On November 10, 1871, he
suspended the writ in another county after finding the requisite rebel-
lion and threat to public safety.148  These suspensions remained in
place until the statute expired on June 10, 1872.149  A bill extending
the President’s authority to suspend was proposed, but Congress did
not enact it.150  Interestingly, the 1871 Act appears to be the only fed-
144 See, e.g., id. at 698 (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (agreeing that the power is legisla-
tive but maintaining that Congress’s delegation to the President was the required exercise
of legislative authority).
145 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 4091–92 (Proclamation of Oct. 17, R
1871).
146 Id. at 4091.  Major Lewis Merrill and his troops “responded with a massive round-up
of suspects.”  Tyler, supra note 2, at 660 (quoting Kermit L. Hall, Political Power and Constitu- R
tional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871–72, 33 EMORY L. J. 921, 925
(1984)).
147 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 4093 (Proclamation of Nov. 3, 1871). R
148 Id. at 4094–95 (Proclamation of Nov. 10, 1871).
149 Section 4 of the statute states that “the provisions of this section shall not be in
force after the end of the next regular session of Congress.”  § 4, 17 Stat. at 15.  The next
session began on December 4, 1871, and ended on June 10, 1872. See House History, OFFICE
OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://artandhistory.house.gov/
house_history/Session_Dates/40to59.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
150 See S. 656, 42d Cong. (1872) (proposing to extend the President’s emergency
power through the end of the next regular session of Congress, which concluded on
March 3, 1873); see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 3d Sess. 2111 (March 3, 1873) (noting
that the bill proposing to extend the Act had been tabled in the House and had now been
“superseded by time”).  The constitutional arguments against delegation were renewed
when the extension was proposed. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3714 (1872)
(statement of Sen. Vickers) (“It is among the legislative powers of Congress, and belongs
exclusively to it.  It is impossible from the nature of the power that it can be conferred
upon another.”); id. at 3719 (statement of Sen. Hamilton) (“[A] bill cannot be defended
in any way, by any mode of argument, which proposes to invest the President of the United
States with the authority to determine when the public safety requires suspension of the
writ.”); id. at 4373 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury) (arguing that only Congress can judge
whether the requisites for suspension have been met); id. at app. 665 (statement of Sen.
Thurman) (complaining that in the bill to extend the Act, as in the original, “Congress,
instead of deciding itself whether the state of case exists which authorizes the suspension of
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eral suspension statute whose constitutionality was not challenged in
court.
While the Lincoln Administration had refused to comply with the
report-and-release provisions included in section 2 of the 1863 Act,151
the Grant Administration obeyed those same statutory require-
ments.152  And in addition to turning over lists of prisoners to the
courts, Grant gave Congress an account of the detentions made pursu-
ant to the suspension order.  In his annual message to Congress on
December 4, 1871, Grant reported “many arrests” in two of the coun-
ties where he had suspended the writ153 but noted that “several hun-
dred” had been released because their “criminality was ascertained to
be of an inferior degree.”154  The most recent count reflected that 168
remained in custody.155  He asserted that “[g]reat caution has been
exercised in making these arrests, and, notwithstanding the large
number, it is believed that no innocent person is now in custody.”156
Shortly after Grant delivered this message, Congress asked him to sub-
mit a formal report detailing both the arrests made under the Act and
the basis for his decision to suspend the writ in the first place.157
Grant responded within three months with a report identifying the
basis of his decision to suspend as information gathered by his attor-
ney general, along with:
information of a similar import from various other sources, among
which were the Joint Select Committee of Congress upon Southern
Outrages, the officers of the State, the military officers of the
United States on duty in South Carolina, the United States attorney
and marshal and other civil officers of the Government, repentant
and abjuring members of those unlawful organizations, persons spe-
the writ, undertakes to devolve the decision of that question upon the President of the
United States”).
151 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. R
152 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE JOINT SELECT COMM. TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONDITION OF
THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES, S. REP. NO. 41-1, at 624 (1872) (noting that the clerk of
the circuit court of the United States at Columbia, South Carolina, had provided it with the
“number of indictments, [sic] found at the late term” and an “official copy of the present-
ment of the grand jury at the late term”).
153 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 4096, 4105 (Third Annual Message). R
154 Id. at 4105.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 A House Resolution adopted on January 25, 1872, pursuant to the advice of the
Joint Select Committee to Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary
States requested that the President communicate to the House “all information in his pos-
session upon which he acted in exercising the powers conferred upon him by [inter alia,
the suspension provision] of the [Ku Klux Klan Act].” See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 596 (1872) (setting forth the text of the resolution); id. at 598–99 (recording House
approval of it).
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cially employed by the Department of Justice to detect crimes
against the United States, and from other credible persons.158
A detailed report prepared by the attorney general detailed the num-
ber and names of those arrested and the disposition of those cases.159
This transparency was a check on executive excess, and it also gave
Congress information relevant to deciding whether further legisla-
tion, including an extension of the suspension provision, was neces-
sary to restore order.
4. Territorial Suspensions
On January 31, 1905, the territorial governor of the Philippines,
Luke Edward Wright, suspended the writ in response to the “open
insurrection” of violent bands of robbers who so terrorized the people
of the Cavite and Batangas provinces that it was “impossible in the
ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before justices of
the peace and other judicial officers. . . .”160  Wright, who had been
appointed by Theodore Roosevelt,161 issued the order pursuant to the
territory’s organic act, which provided:
[T]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the pub-
lic safety may require it, in either of which events the same may be
suspended by the President, or by the governor, with the approval
of the Philippine Commission, wherever during such period the ne-
cessity for such suspension shall exist.162
158 CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 268, at 2 (2d.
Sess. 1872).
159 Id. at 3–19.
160 Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 179–80 (1906) (quoting order).
161 Wright, who succeeded William Howard Taft in the post, was appointed by
Roosevelt and confirmed by the Senate in 1904. See Luke Edward Wright, U.S. ARMY CENTER
OF MILITARY HISTORY, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Sw-SA/Wright.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2013); see also Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 1, 32 Stat. 692 (providing that the
President would appoint all civil governors of the Philippines, as well as all members of the
Philippines Commission, with the advice and consent of the Senate).  Like Taft, Wright
went on to become Secretary of War. See Luke Edward Wright, supra.
162 Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691, 692.  In 1916, Congress passed a new
organic statute for the Philippines.  Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545.  That statute
contained a similar delegation of suspension authority; the primary difference was that the
Philippines Commission no longer had a role in the process. See id. at 546 (“[T]he privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion,
insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it, in either of which events the
same may be suspended by the President, or by the Governor General, wherever during
such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.”).  The constitution of the Philip-
pines, adopted pursuant to congressional authorization in 1935, superseded the Act. See
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES (Feb. 8, 1935).  The Philippines became independent of
the United States in 1946, see Treaty of General Relations, U.S.-Phil., Jul. 4, 1946, 61 Stat.
1174.
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Finding the conditions for suspension satisfied, the Philippines Com-
mission, members of which had also been appointed by Roosevelt,
adopted a resolution authorizing the governor to suspend the writ,
which he did in two provinces on the very same day.163  Wright re-
voked the suspension nearly ten months later.164
Congress’s delegation of suspension authority to the Executive
Branch drew constitutional challenge.  In Fisher v. Baker, a prisoner
held pursuant to the January 31 order contended that the order was
invalid because “[u]nder the Constitution, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus rests in Congress, and cannot be
delegated to the Philippine Governor and Commission.”165  The Solic-
itor General of the United States countered that the Constitution left
Congress free to delegate the suspension power to the Executive.166
Because the Supreme Court dismissed the case on jurisdictional
grounds, it did not resolve the question.167
The writ was suspended for a second time in a U.S. territory on
the day Japan bombed Pearl Harbor.  On December 7, 1941, Joseph
Poindexter, the territorial governor of Hawaii, issued an order
“hereby suspend[ing] the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus until
further notice.”168  Poindexter, who had been appointed by Franklin
163 Fisher, 203 U.S. at 179–80.
164 Id. at 181.
165 Id. at 176.  He also argued that the order was invalid because “[i]nsurrection is
necessarily political,” but ladronism (robbery), the stated basis for the suspension, “is [a]
mere common law crime.” Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted).  He pointed out,
moreover, that the Suspension Clause did not authorize suspension in cases of “insurrec-
tion,” as opposed to cases of “rebellion.” Id. at 176 (“The attempted inclusion of ‘insurrec-
tion,’ as a ground of suspension, is unconstitutional and void.  ‘Insurrection’ is not
synonymous with rebellion.”).  As this argument reflects, the petitioner took the position
that the protection of the Suspension Clause extended to the Philippines, a position with
which the United States disagreed. Id. at 178 (argument of the Solicitor General) (assert-
ing that “the act for the Philippines . . . is not subject to the precise limitations of the
constitutional provision”).
166 The Solicitor General claimed that “[i]t has been decided” that Congress could
leave the “public safety” determination to the President’s discretion and that “[i]t has not
been decided that, so authorized, he may not determine whether the exigency of invasion
or rebellion has arisen.” Id. For the former proposition, he cited In re Oliver, 17 Wis. 681
(1864), which upheld the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 against a delegation challenge.
Fisher, 203 U.S. at 177.  As discussed above, that opinion does not hold it permissible for
Congress to give the President the authority to decide the public safety issue.  On the
contrary, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s serious constitutional doubts about whether Con-
gress could do so prompted it to avoid the question by construing the 1863 Act as an
outright suspension. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. R
167 Fisher, 203 U.S. at 181–82.
168 Garner Anthony, Martial Law, Military Government and the Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Hawaii, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 477, 507 (1943) (reprinting order in Appendix I).  The Hawaiian
Organic Act provided that the territorial governor “shall be appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and shall hold office
for four years . . . unless sooner removed by the President.” See Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch.
339, § 66, 31 Stat. 141, 153.
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D. Roosevelt, acted pursuant to the Hawaiian Organic Act, in which
Congress included the following authorization:
[The governor] may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent
danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory, or any part
thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the
President and his decision thereon made known.169
Governor Poindexter cabled President Roosevelt on December 7 to
inform him that he had both imposed martial law and suspended the
privilege of the writ.170  Roosevelt approved this decision two days
later.171  The suspension remained in effect for almost three years;
Roosevelt restored the privilege on October 24, 1944.172  Some con-
tended that the suspension had continued long after both the threat
to public safety and the risk of another invasion had diminished.173
While the Philippines and Hawaii are the only territories in which
the writ was actually suspended, the organic acts of the Virgin Is-
169 Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 67, at 153.  The lack of a comma after the phrase
“martial law” makes it possible to read the statute as giving the President power to override
the territorial governor only with respect to the declaration of martial law and not to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.  This ambiguity was corrected in Guam’s later-en-
acted statute, which employed nearly identical language but included a comma to make
clear that the “presidential notification” clause applied to both the suspension and martial
law decisions. See infra note 176. Hawaii’s territorial law was superseded after Hawaii be- R
came a state in 1959. See Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 15, 73 Stat. 4, 11 (provid-
ing that “[t]erritorial law enacted by the Congress shall be terminated two years after the
date of admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union or upon the effective date of any
law enacted by the State of Hawaii which amends or repeals it, whichever may occur first”).
170 See Anthony, supra note 168, at 478 (“I have today declared martial law throughout R
the Territory of Hawaii and have suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.”).
171 See id.
172 Proclamation No. 2627, 3 C.F.R. § 41 (Oct. 19, 1944).
173 In July of 1943, the district court of the Territory of Hawaii held in an unpublished
opinion that detainees could invoke the privilege because Hawaii was no longer in immi-
nent danger of invasion after the Battle of Midway.  Anthony, supra note 168, at 486–87; see R
also Ex parte Spurlock, 66 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (D. Haw. 1944) (asserting that “[t]he privilege
cannot remain suspended by fiat after all reason for its suspension has passed”).  The
Ninth Circuit took the position that in the face of conflicting evidence about the necessity
of continued suspension, a federal court could not substitute its judgment for that of mili-
tary authorities. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 146 F.2d 576, 581–83 (9th Cir. 1944), rev’d on
other grounds, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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lands174 and Puerto Rico175 also contained at one point a delegation
of suspension authority identical to that contained in the Hawaiian
organic statute.  The Organic Act of Guam had a nearly identical sus-
pension provision.176  None of these delegation provisions remains in
effect today.177
The delegations in these five territorial statutes were sweeping.
In contrast to the Civil War and Reconstruction statutes, they were not
enacted in response to events that arguably justified suspension.  In
Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam, such events never in fact
arose.  The Philippines suspension provision was enacted in 1902; the
events giving rise to its exercise did not occur until three years later.
The time lag is even more extreme in the case of Hawaii: the governor
exercised the suspension authority forty-one years after Congress dele-
gated it.
174 See Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 699, § 20, 49 Stat. 1807, 1812.  This provision also
appeared in the 1954 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands. See Act of July 22, 1954,
ch. 558, § 11, 68 Stat. 497, 503.  A 1968 amendment to this section omitted the reference to
suspension, while retaining the governor’s authority to declare martial law. See Act of Aug.
3, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-496, § 4, 82 Stat. 837, 838.  The original organic act providing a
temporary government for the Virgin Islands contained no suspension provision; however,
that omission is unsurprising given the skeletal nature of the statute which simply vested
“all military, civil, and judicial powers” in a governor appointed by the President.  Act of
Mar. 3, 1917, ch. 171, § 1, 39 Stat. 1132, 1132.
175 See Jones Act, ch. 145, § 12, 39 Stat. 951, 955 (1917) (authorizing the governor “in
case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires
it [to] suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the island, or any part
thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the President and the
President’s decision therein made known”).  The Jones Act was Puerto Rico’s second or-
ganic statute.  Its first did not contain a suspension provision.  See Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch.
191, § 17, 31 Stat. 77, 81.  The Act of July 3, 1950, which allowed Puerto Rico to draft its
own constitution, repealed the suspension provision of the Jones Act. See Act of July 3,
1950, ch. 446, § 5(2), 64 Stat. 319, 320.
176 That statute provided that “[the governor] may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place Guam, or any part thereof, under martial law, until commu-
nication can be had with the President and the President’s decision thereon communi-
cated to the Governor.”  Act of Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, § 6, 64 Stat. 384, 386.  Note that this
statute supplies a comma after the phrase “martial law,” making clear that it extends the
power of presidential override to the suspension of habeas as well as to the declaration of
martial law. See supra note 169.  The 1960 version of the Act retained the suspension provi- R
sion, see § 6(b); the 1968 version eliminated the suspension authority but retained guber-
natorial authority to declare martial law, see Act of Sept. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-497, § 1,
82 Stat. 842, 843.
177 See supra notes 162, 169, 175, 176, and 176.  The legislative history of the statutes R
regarding Puerto Rico and Guam, which remain U.S. territories, suggests that Congress
withdrew the suspension power from the territorial governor when he became an elected
official not subject to the supervision of the President. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 89-1520, at 7
(1966) (explaining that the territorial governor’s power to suspend the writ of habeas was
removed under the revised organic acts of Guam and the Virgin Islands because that
power is “inappropriate for an elected local official, not supervised by the President or his
designee”).
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Congress’s rationale for vesting these territorial governors with
suspension authority may have been the distance of these territories
from the mainland.  A House report on the bill that became the 1900
Hawaiian Act noted that:
The governor of the Territory of Hawaii . . . is given authority to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to place the
Territory under martial law when such course is required by the
public safety.  These provisions are necessary in view of the distance
of the islands and the nature of existing means of communication
and transportation.178
That said, Congress did not consistently delegate suspension authority
to every governor of a distant territory.179  Its inclusion of such provi-
sions in territorial statutes was sporadic rather than systematic.
In contrast to the Civil War and Reconstruction statutes, delega-
tion in the territorial context apparently generated no controversy in
Congress.  It is impossible to say why, although some have speculated
that the inattention may be partly explained by contemporary doubts
about whether the Constitution—and thus the protection of the Sus-
pension Clause—applied in American territories.180  Whatever as-
178 H.R. REP. NO. 55-1808, at 2 (1899).
179 For example, both the Organic Act of Hawaii, adopted in 1900, and the Organic
Act of the Philippines, adopted in 1902, vested the territorial governor and commission
with such power, see supra note 162, but the first Puerto Rican Organic Act, adopted in R
1900, did not.  Congress added the Puerto Rican suspension provision in 1917. See supra
note 175.  Moreover, the acts governing the territory of Alaska, passed in the same period, R
did not grant suspension authority to the Alaskan governor. See Act of May 17, 1884,
ch. 53, § 2, 23 Stat. 24, 24; see also Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 387, 37 Stat. 512.  Delegations of
suspension authority were also absent from acts establishing territories located in the main-
land United States but far enough away from the capital so as to render the exchange of
information difficult given then-existing means of transportation and communication.
Historically, most territorial statutes have incorporated by reference the Northwest Ordi-
nance, which rendered the territorial governor the “commander-in-chief of the militia,”
but said nothing about either martial law or the suspension of habeas.  Act of Aug. 7, 1789,
ch. 8, 1 Stat 50, 51.  Current territorial statutes typically grant the territorial governor the
power to impose martial law but not to suspend the privilege of the writ. See supra note
177. R
180 See Diller, supra note 20, at 598 n.66 (positing that the “rather unbridled discretion R
Congress gave territorial governors to suspend habeas in the Philippine and Hawaiian Or-
ganic Acts is likely a result of Congress not initially viewing those territories as fully pro-
tected by the United States Constitution”) (internal citations omitted).  The question
whether the Constitution was understood to apply to these territories in the early twentieth
century is a complicated one. See Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme
Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101, 127–32 (2011) (describing politi-
cal controversy at the turn of the twentieth century about whether the Constitution “fol-
lowed the flag” to newly acquired American territories); Gary Lawson, Territorial
Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 874–78 (1990) (describing the
evolution of Supreme Court doctrine between 1901 and 1922 on this question).  The an-
swer, moreover, may not be the same for each territory.  Hawaii, as an incorporated terri-
tory, was one to which the Constitution was thought to extend of its own force, see Kent,
supra, at 108–09 (describing the doctrine of territorial incorporation), and even if it did
not, Congress had rendered it almost fully applicable by statute. See Act of Apr. 30, 1900,
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sumptions Congress may have made at the time, these statutes
provoke the question whether Congress could employ the same
open-ended model again.  Indeed, recall that during the Reconstruc-
tion debates, Representative Sheldon contended that Congress had
the authority to pass just that sort of statute with respect to the United
States proper.181  These statutes and the suspensions resulting from
them offer concrete examples of what such an assertion of authority
might look like and a means of considering whether such broad dele-
gations adequately preserve the benefits of locating the suspension
power in Congress.
III
CONTINGENT SUSPENSION AND CANCELLATION AUTHORITY
This history makes clear that the separation of powers debate sur-
rounding suspension has been more complicated than the stark “Lin-
coln versus Congress” dispute about whether Congress alone possesses
the power to initiate a suspension.  The emergence of the delegation
model provoked a serious debate about whether Congress has to
make the “invasion or rebellion” and “public safety” determinations
itself or whether it can vest the President with authority to make those
judgments at some later date.  While critics of the statutes did not
frame the argument quite this way, the claim is essentially that contin-
gency format delegations are unconstitutional in this context.
Contingent legislation—legislation taking effect upon satisfaction
of some condition rather than a date certain—is a standard means by
which Congress delegates discretion to the Executive Branch.182  As
Gary Lawson has observed, “Normally, a statute’s effective date will be
ch. 339, § 5, 31 Stat. 141, 141–42 (“[T]he Constitution, and . . . all the laws of the United
States . . . not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said
Territory [of Hawaii] as elsewhere in the United States.”).  Unincorporated territories like
the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands enjoyed the protection of only
the Constitution’s “fundamental rights”; the question whether the protection afforded by
the Suspension Clause qualified as one of those rights was apparently unsettled.  See supra
note 165.  As a matter of modern doctrine, the Suspension Clause applies not only to R
territories over which the United States is formally sovereign but also to those over which it
exercises de facto control. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that
the Suspension Clause “has full effect at Guanta´namo Bay”).
181 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. R
182 Laurence Tribe has explained that statutes delegating authority to the Executive
Branch fall into two broad categories: (1) contingent legislation, which “condition[s] the
operation of legislation upon an administrative agency official’s determination of certain
facts” and (2) legislation authorizing interstitial administrative action, which sets forth a
broad policy directive and charges an administrative agency to “fill up the details.” LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 979 (3d ed. 2000) (citations omitted).
Kevin Stack has observed that “[w]hile these contingency format delegations are no longer
the standard form of delegations to agencies, Congress still regularly employs them when it
delegates power directly to the President.” Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s
Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2009).
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a calendar date, but there is no evident reason why that effective date
cannot be determined by some event other than celestial motions—
such as legislation that takes effect only upon occurrence of natural
disasters.”183  Delegation is what makes contingent legislation possi-
ble, for Congress must rely upon executive or judicial agents to deter-
mine when the conditions rendering the statute effective are
satisfied.184  Congress has passed contingent legislation since the early
days of the Republic,185 and the Court has held that refusing Congress
this ability would “rob the legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not
yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know.”186  So
long as Congress lays down an “intelligible principle” to guide the de-
termination of when the conditions rendering the statute are satisfied,
contingent legislation is permissible.187
One difficulty with the use of contingent legislation in this con-
text relates to the particular kind of authority the federal suspension
statutes have conferred.  The statutes passed thus far have granted the
President so-called cancellation authority—that is, the authority to
cancel the operation of other then-effective laws upon the occurrence
of a stated contingency.  Once the President determined that the stat-
utory prerequisites of “invasion or rebellion” and “threat to public
safety” had been met, each statute permitted him to cancel statutes
granting federal courts jurisdiction to order the release of prisoners,
statutes granting various procedural rights, and even some of the pro-
183 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 364 (2002); see
also Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 132 F.3d 1467, 1474 (1998) (observing that “[t]he
Court frequently has upheld Congress’ delegation of responsibilities to the Executive
through contingent legislation requiring an executive agent to take some action upon the
finding of specified conditions”).
184 See Lawson, supra note 183, at 387 (“[T]here is no reason why Congress cannot R
entrust executive and judicial agents with the implementational task of determining
whether those specified events have occurred.”).
185 For example, the Calling Forth Act of 1792, a version of which remains in the
United States Code today, see 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–332 (2012), provided that “whenever the
United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion . . . it shall be lawful
for the President . . . to call forth such number of the militia of the state or states . . . as he
may judge necessary to repel such invasion.”  Calling Forth Act of 1972, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat.
264, 264.  In the event of insurrection, the statute authorized the President “to call forth
such number of the militia of any other state or states . . . as he may judge sufficient to
suppress such insurrection.” Id.  For a comparison of the President’s power to call forth
the militia and his power to suspend, see infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text. R
186 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892); see also J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (“Congress may feel itself unable conveniently to deter-
mine exactly when its exercise of the legislative power should become effective, because
dependent on future conditions, and it may leave the determination of such time to the
decision of an Executive . . . .”).
187 See J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409 (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
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cedural guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights.  Congress assuredly
has the power to repeal statutes either temporarily or permanently
and, by virtue of the Constitution’s emergency power, to suspend tem-
porarily some of the procedural protections of liberty guaranteed
therein.188  But the temporary repeal accomplished pursuant to these
statutes was effected by executive order rather than by legislation.
Contingent legislation does not always or even often include cancella-
tion authority.189  When it does, however, such legislation is suscepti-
ble to the objection that it permits the President to repeal law outside
the process of bicameralism and presentment.
The Court has sent mixed signals about the validity of statutes
that vest the Executive with contingent authority to revive or cancel
statutes.  In two leading nineteenth century cases, the Court upheld
such legislation.  In The Brig Aurora, the Court held constitutional a
statute providing that if either Great Britain or France violated the
neutral commerce of the United States, the President could revive by
188 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.  The Suspension Clause is not itself R
the source of Congress’s authority to suspend, for it is phrased as a restraint upon power
rather than a grant of it. But see Diller, supra note 20, at 602 (proposing that the Suspen- R
sion Clause itself impliedly authorizes Congress to suspend the writ).  While the Court has
never addressed the issue, scholars and legislators have proposed a number of theories
about the source of congressional power.  One is that the power to suspend emanates from
Congress’s power to regulate the federal courts.  This proposition, however, “is in signifi-
cant tension with the very plausible understanding of the Suspension Clause as designed,
at least in part, to restrain Congress from suspending habeas corpus in the state courts.”
Id. at 602 n.94.  Another leading scholar has posited that the “federal power to suspend the
writ . . . must be deduced as an ancillary power to implement one of Congress’s substantive
powers that is relevant to the particular emergency.”  Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus
Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555, 600 (2002).  Candi-
dates include the War Power (if war is declared); the Militia Clause (if the Militia is called
to suppress the rebellion or repel the invasion); the Guarantee Clause (when suspension
offers protection from invasion or when the state seeks assistance in suppressing domestic
violence); and the Commerce Clause (when the invasion or rebellion threatens interstate
commerce). See id.  There are still other clauses that may justify suspension in particular
situations.  For example, the Reconstruction Congress, which suspended to subvert the Ku
Klux Klan, identified Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the source of its power.
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 75 (1871) (statement of Rep. Wood) (as-
serting that suspension of the writ, among other things, is “proposed to be . . . authorized
by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).  When it comes
to U.S. territories, Article IV, Section 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution, which grants Congress
plenary authority to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States,” might empower Congress insofar as sus-
pension may be a “needful Rule” under this Article.  Perhaps most attractive, however, is to
simply say that whatever the particular circumstance, a suspension carries into execution
all powers vested in the government of the United States by helping to “ensure the contin-
ued execution of governmental laws and [to] sustain[ ] the Constitution’s ultimate author-
ity.”  Prakash, supra note 13, at 592 (offering further detail as to why suspensions are both R
“necessary” and “proper” to furthering this aim).
189 For example, the Calling Forth Act of 1972, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 264, one of the
earliest examples of contingent legislation, gave the President authority to call out the
militia upon satisfaction of certain conditions but did not confer cancellation authority.
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proclamation a then-expired law imposing trade restrictions on the
offending country.190  In Field v. Clark, the Court upheld a statute pro-
viding that if the President deemed duties imposed on products ex-
ported from the United States to be “reciprocally unequal and
unreasonable,” it was his “duty to suspend, by proclamation to that
effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free introduction of
such [items produced by that country], for such time as he shall deem
just.”191  The appellants in both The Brig Aurora and Field argued that
authorizing the President to render a law effective or ineffective by
proclamation violated Article I, Section 7’s requirement of bicamera-
lism and presentment.192  The Court maintained, however, that enact-
ment satisfied the legislative process and the President merely
executed the law.  As the Court put it in Field, “[t]he legislature can-
not delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.”193  In support of
its conclusion, the Court cited a string of statutes, dating from 1798,
authorizing the President to either impose or lift statutory trade re-
strictions when he judged that doing so would be in the interest of the
United States.194
One might have thought the Court settled the validity of this kind
of contingent legislation—legislation empowering the Executive to
render expired statutory provisions effective or otherwise applicable
ones ineffective—after cases like The Brig Aurora and Field.  The Court
more recently suggested, however, that cancellation statutes like the
one upheld in Field may be exceptional.  In Clinton v. City of New York,
the Court held that the Line Item Veto Act, which permitted the Presi-
dent to cancel spending provisions,195 authorized the President “to
effect the repeal of laws . . . without observing the procedures set out
in Article I, Section 7.”196  The Court distinguished Field and the stat-
utes it approvingly cited for two reasons.  First, those statutes all dealt
190 Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States (The Brig Aurora), 11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813)
(“[W]e can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion
in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment
should direct.”).
191 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).
192 See The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. at 386 (“To make the revival of a law depend upon the
President’s proclamation, is to give to that proclamation the force of a law.”); Field, 143
U.S. at 681 (“The plaintiffs in error contend that this section, so far as it authorizes the
President to suspend [certain] provisions of the act . . . is unconstitutional, as delegating to
him both legislative and treaty-making powers . . . .”).
193 Field, 143 U.S. at 694 (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 Id. at 684–90.
195 524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998) (noting that “[t]he Line Item Veto Act [gave] the Presi-
dent the power to ‘cancel in whole’ three types of provisions that have been signed into
law”).
196 Id. at 445.
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with foreign trade, an area in which the President’s inherent authority
over foreign affairs increases the discretion he may exercise.197  Sec-
ond and more important, the cited statutes imposed a duty upon the
President to suspend the operation of a particular statute when he
found the condition satisfied rather than leaving the decision to his
discretion.198  The Field Court had itself emphasized the importance
of this factor insofar as it insisted that “[n]othing involving the expedi-
ency or the just operation of [the Customs Administration Act] was
left to the determination of the President,” for Congress prescribed
the conditions that would trigger a suspension of free trade, and once
the President ascertained the existence of those conditions, it “be-
came his duty to issue a proclamation declaring the suspension.”199
As a legal matter, then, the statute itself temporarily repealed the free
trade provisions, and the President’s proclamation merely recognized
that fact.  Had Congress authorized the President to suspend when he
saw fit, the temporary repeal would have resulted from the executive
order rather than the statute, and that would have been
impermissible.200
The suspension statute the Maryland legislature enacted during
the Revolutionary War is an example of the sort of contingent legisla-
tion that the Court approved in Field and Clinton.  Once the governor
determined that an “invasion” had occurred, suspension automatically
197 See id. at 444–45.
198 Id. at 445 (emphasizing that in the statutes discussed in Field, “Congress itself made
the decision to suspend or repeal the particular provisions at issue upon the occurrence of
particular events subsequent to enactment, and it left only the determination whether such
events occurred up to the President”).
199 Field, 143 U.S. at 693.  The statute at issue in The Brig Aurora operated the same way
insofar as it provided that the President “shall declare by proclamation” when either France
or Great Britain ceased unfair trade practices, at which point restrictions imposed by that
statute “shall . . . cease and be discontinued” as to that nation, and provisions of another
statute imposing restrictions “shall . . . be revived[ ] and have full force and effect” as to the
other if that nation did not cease unfair practices within three months.  11 U.S. at 384
(emphases added) (internal quotations omitted); see also Field, 143 U.S. at 682.  In uphold-
ing the Act, the Court apparently accepted counsel’s argument that the statute, rather than
the executive order, accomplished the repeal of one law and revival of the other, as Con-
gress “only prescribed the evidence which should be admitted of a fact, upon which the law
should go into effect.”  11 U.S. at 387 (argument of counsel).
200 While the statute at issue in Field imposed a duty on the President, not all of the
statutes cited approvingly in Field did.  As Justice Breyer noted in the dissent, “some of the
statutes imposed no duty upon the President at all,” and “[o]thers imposed a ‘duty’ in
terms so vague as to leave substantial discretion in the President’s hands.” Clinton, 524 U.S.
at 493 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).  For example, a statute passed in 1799
permitted the President to suspend statutory restrictions on trade with France “if he shall
deem it expedient and consistent with the interest of the United States,” and to reimpose
them “whenever, in his opinion, the interest of the United States shall require.” See Field,
143 U.S. at 684 (quoting statute) (emphasis omitted).  The Clinton majority responded that
insofar as any of the statutes cited in Field could be interpreted as giving the President
discretion to cancel or revive statutes, the Court had never passed on their constitutional-
ity. See 524 U.S. at 444 n.36.
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followed.201  All of the federal suspension statutes, however, have
given the President the discretion, rather than the duty, to suspend
the writ.  Both the Civil War and Reconstruction statutes authorized,
but did not require, the President to suspend the privilege of the writ
when he judged the public safety to require it,202 and the five territo-
rial statutes each provided that the President, or the governor subject
to his supervision, “may” suspend the privilege upon finding the statu-
tory conditions satisfied.203  If, as the Clinton Court contends, a statute
giving the President the discretion to suspend other statutes upon the
occurrence of some contingency violates Article I, Section 7, then all
of the federal suspension statutes passed thus far fail on that basis.
This defect, however, is one of form rather than substance, and
accordingly, it should not give us great pause.  To the extent that the
suspension-by-delegation model employed thus far has permitted the
amendment or repeal of statutes outside of the Article I, Section 7
process, that flaw could be remedied.  Consider that the effectiveness
of the line-item veto lay in the very structure of the innovation.204  In
the case of suspension statutes, however, the structure of the suspen-
sion—i.e., whether the legal consequence of repeal flows from the
statute or the executive order—should be a matter of indifference to
Congress.  Congress could have rewritten any of the seven federal sus-
pension statutes to provide that when an invasion or a rebellion oc-
curs, and when the public safety requires it, the President shall notice
the same by proclamation, at which point the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall be suspended.  That formulation does not change
the substance of the President’s responsibility, but it avoids the objec-
tion that the order, rather than the statute itself, has the legal effect of
suspending other laws.  So long as Congress ensures that the President
acts as a fact-finder rather than a law-repealer, it observes the require-
ments of the lawmaking process.205  It is thus unnecessary to examine
the soundness of the Court’s reasoning in Clinton or to settle conclu-
201 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.  The rebellion prong of the Reconstruc- R
tion statute functioned similarly.  When the President determined that the conditions Con-
gress described existed, the statute provided that “such combinations shall be deemed a
rebellion.”  Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13 (emphasis added).  It was the
public safety prong on which he had discretion. Id.; see also supra note 132 and accompany- R
ing text.
202 See supra notes 80–132 and accompanying text. R
203 See supra note 169 and accompanying text and notes 174–76. R
204 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 497 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing the mechanism of
the line-item veto as “an experiment that may, or may not, help representative government
work better”).  The value of the one-house veto—another delegation that ran afoul of Arti-
cle I, Section 7—similarly lay in its very structure. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 972
(1983) (White, J., dissenting) (characterizing the one-house veto as “an important[,] if not
indispensable[,] political invention”).
205 Note that the structure of such a statute would track almost exactly the structure of
the statute approved in Field v. Clark.  As the Court there put it,
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sively whether that case applies here, for its holding poses no absolute
bar to contingency format delegations of what is functionally, if not
formally, cancellation authority.206
To be sure, the proposition that Congress can accomplish some-
thing as serious as suspension on a contingent basis is unsettling, for
such a statute relinquishes Congress’s ability to assess the need for
suspension when the events provoking it actually arise.  That determi-
nation is left instead to the President, who is more likely to value se-
curity over liberty in a time of crisis.207  Because, however, the
Constitution does not generally prohibit contingent cancellation legis-
lation, any objection to Congress’s leaving the need for suspension to
the President’s judgment must rest on the Constitution’s specific
treatment of suspension.  The next Part considers whether the Sus-
pension Clause itself imposes any limits.
IV
THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AS A LIMIT UPON
CONTINGENT LEGISLATION
This Part explores whether the Suspension Clause limits Con-
gress’s ability to pass contingent suspension legislation in a class of
cases that may or may not arise.  As explained above, the Necessary
and Proper Clause generally permits Congress to pass statutes whose
effectiveness hinges upon events that may occur soon, in the distant
future, or not at all.  Conditional grants of authority thus give the leg-
islature great flexibility to provide for the future, and Congress has
taken advantage of that flexibility in the suspension statutes, which
have varied widely in their relationship to specific events.  Congress
[l]egislative power was exercised when Congress declared that the suspen-
sion should take effect upon a named contingency.  What the President was
required to do was simply in execution of the act of Congress. . . .  He was
the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the
event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.
Field, 143 U.S. at 693.
206 That said, Clinton does suggest in passing that contingent delegations of cancella-
tion authority might be confined to the context of foreign trade, which is the only context
in which the Court has upheld contingent cancellation statutes. See 524 U.S. at 445 (em-
phasizing that the contingent cancellation statutes cited approvingly in Field “all relate to
foreign trade, and this Court has recognized that in the foreign affairs arena, the President
has ‘a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved’”) (citation omitted); cf. id. at 464–65
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the argument that the
power to cancel an item of spending is wholly nondelegable but suggesting that the
nondelegation doctrine may impose “much more severe limits” on cancellation statutes
than on other kinds of statutes).  Because its scope extends far beyond the context of
suspension, I will not pursue the Court’s suggestion in this Article.  If, however, the Court
is correct, there may be reasons wholly apart from the Suspension Clause to treat these
delegations differently.
207 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. R
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enacted the Civil War statute after the start of a rebellion.  But it
passed the the Reconstruction statute before it was ready to say that
Klan violence constituted a rebellion, and it passed the territorial stat-
utes prior to any anticipated, much less imminent, rebellion or inva-
sion.  Congress passed all seven of the statutes before it was certain
that emergency power was necessary to protect the public safety.
This Part argues that only the Civil War suspension was constitu-
tional.  The Suspension Clause requires two findings before a suspen-
sion can be imposed: first, that a rebellion or an invasion exists and
second, that the public safety may require it.208  This Part explains
that Congress must make both findings itself, as it did in the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1863.  It emphasizes, however, that the Clause requires
only a tentative finding on the public safety prong.  Once Congress
determines that a rebellion or an invasion exists and that protecting
the public safety may require suspension, it can task the President with
the responsibility of deciding when and where the threat to public
safety is severe enough to require suspension.  In other words, the
Clause limits, but does not entirely rule out, contingency format dele-
gations to the Executive.  So long as Congress makes the threshold
findings that the Clause demands, Congress can condition the suspen-
sion’s effectiveness upon the Executive’s determination that the pub-
lic safety actually requires the exercise of emergency power.
This interpretation of the Suspension Clause is consistent with its
language and history but is rendered particularly compelling by a
functional analysis.  While Congress has significant leeway to act inde-
pendently of triggering events in the context of social and economic
regulation and in areas of inherent executive authority, the Suspen-
sion Clause limits Congress’s freedom to do so when it empowers the
Executive to deploy emergency power.
A. The Text and Background Assumptions of the Clause
The Suspension Clause provides in full: “The Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.”209  It thus re-
quires two determinations: first, that a rebellion or an invasion exists
and second, that protecting the public safety may require suspension.
The question whether Congress can task the President with making
the first determination—that an invasion or rebellion exists—is a diffi-
208 The “invasion or rebellion” determination and the “public safety” determination
cannot be collapsed into a single step; rather, there is work for Congress to do on both
prongs of the analysis.  Recall, for example, that during the Burr Conspiracy debates, some
congressmen conceded the existence of a rebellion but refused to suspend on the ground
that the rebellion did not sufficiently endanger the public safety. See supra note 78 and R
accompanying text.
209 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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cult one on which the language of the Clause is inconclusive.  The
issue is presented by the Reconstruction statute, which left the Presi-
dent to determine when Klan violence matured into a rebellion, and
by all five territorial statutes.  On the one hand, the Clause’s provision
that Congress can suspend the privilege of the writ only “when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion” could mean that Congress can act only
when the country is actually in a state of rebellion or invasion—and
thus that Congress must make a real-time determination itself rather
than leaving that question to the President.  On the other hand, one
could take the phrase “when in” to refer to general circumstances
rather than a specific event.  This interpretation would permit Con-
gress to enact a suspension statute in advance, leaving the President to
decide when an invasion or rebellion and sufficient threat to public
safety activated his authority to preventatively and indefinitely detain.
The word “cases” in the Clause is similarly ambiguous.  It can be un-
derstood to mean action on a case-by-case basis, but it could also de-
scribe all “cases” of a particular type.  Thus, it cannot be said, based on
the text alone, that the existence of actual invasion or rebellion is a
prerequisite to legislative action.
Nor is the history conclusive.  Those discussing the Clause in the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not expressly address
whether Congress could make a suspension of the writ contingent
upon a rebellion or an invasion that might arise sometime in the (per-
haps distant) future.  Yet they did firmly believe both that Congress
was the department with authority to suspend the writ and that Con-
gress should be severely limited in its ability to do so.  These two
widely accepted principles are at least some evidence that those in the
founding generation took the phrase “when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion” as a temporal constraint permitting Congress to enact an
authorization of emergency power only when then-existing facts put it
on the table.  This understanding is consistent with the way Parlia-
ment and state legislatures acted in the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries and indeed with the way the United States Congress
acted until the twentieth century.  Some of those statutes were passed
when invasion was imminent rather than actual,210 but none was
passed in total isolation from any provoking event.
Late-eighteenth-century Americans were familiar with open-en-
ded contingency format delegations.  One of the best known exam-
ples is the Calling Forth Act of 1792, which empowered the President
to call forth state militia “whenever the United States shall be invaded,
210 This was true of the 1777 Massachusetts suspension, see supra note 57, as well as the R
1777 Maryland statute, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.  Neither Massachusetts R
nor Maryland was bound by a constitution that specifically restricted suspension to rebel-
lion or invasion.
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or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or In-
dian tribe.”211  One might view the Calling Forth Act as precedent
supporting Congress’s power to employ the contingent format in the
suspension context.  This statute has a long historical pedigree, is un-
controversial, and requires the President to make a judgment similar
to that involved in a decision to suspend the writ.  As a result, advo-
cates of broad congressional authority to delegate suspension power
to the President have sometimes invoked the Calling Forth Act as evi-
dence that open-ended grants of contingent authority are permissible
in the suspension context as well.212  The analogy, however, is inappo-
site.  The limitation upon a contingent delegation of suspension au-
thority derives from the Suspension Clause, which is inapplicable to
statutes delegating power to call out the militia.213  Indeed, rather
than imposing a temporal limitation, the Constitution’s Calling Forth
Clause, which authorizes Congress to “provide for calling forth the Mili-
tia,”214 contemplates that Congress will equip the President with au-
thority on a contingent basis.  Early Americans knew how to confer
open-ended contingent authority, yet they did not do so in either the
state suspension statutes or the bill considered during the Burr
Conspiracy.
Contingency format legislation gives Congress the flexibility to
provide in advance for events that it cannot foresee, but those who
framed and ratified the Suspension Clause were not interested in leg-
islative flexibility.  Instead, they sought to restrain Congress by reserv-
ing the exercise of emergency power for the most extreme
211 Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 264, 264.  The current version of the
statute confers similar authority. See 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (providing that “[w]henever
the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebel-
lion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of
the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call
into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he
considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion”).
212 See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text; cf. Prakash, supra note 13, at 612 R
(“In the first Militia Act, Congress exercised its authority to provide for calling for the
militia to execute the laws by specifying conditions in which the President might summon
the militias.  Similarly, the Congress might use the Necessary and Proper Clause to specify
the circumstances in which the President might suspend habeas corpus.”).
213 The delegation in the Calling Forth Act is also distinguishable from that in the
suspension statutes because of the kind of power it confers.  The Court has consistently
held that the Constitution permits particularly sweeping delegations in areas in which the
Executive possesses some authority in his own right. See supra note 106 and infra note 286. R
The President’s power as Commander in Chief coincides with his power to call out the
militia. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in
Chief . . . of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States . . . .”).  The President possesses no inherent authority, however, to suspend
the privilege of the writ. See Prakash, supra note 13, at 602–04 (explaining why neither the R
Commander in Chief clause nor the grant of executive power gives the President inherent
authority to suspend); supra note 13 and accompanying text. R
214 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (emphasis added).
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circumstances.215  It would be somewhat odd for those intent on se-
verely restricting Congress to believe simultaneously that the Clause
allowed Congress to unleash emergency power more easily by provid-
ing for it in advance.  Interpreting the phrase “when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion” to require contemporaneous legislative evaluation of
security crises on a case-by-case basis is more consistent with the pos-
ture of the founding generation toward the authorization of emer-
gency power.  On this reading, the phrase specifies not only the
circumstances under which Congress can authorize emergency power
but also the time at which Congress can enact the authorization.
Neither the Clause’s text nor its history conclusively establishes
that those in the founding era believed that the Suspension Clause
precluded Congress from authorizing emergency power contingent
upon a later rebellion or invasion.  Evidence for this proposition is
embedded in the view that suspension power belongs to the legisla-
ture, which is itself a background assumption of the Clause.216  None-
theless, it seems probable that those who deemed legislative
supremacy in suspension important agreed with Blackstone, who
observed:
[T]he happiness of our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive
power to determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render this
measure expedient.  For the parliament only, or legislative power,
whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by suspending
the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to imprison sus-
pected persons without giving any reason for so doing.217
215 The state constitutions authorizing suspension reserved it for the “most urgent and
pressing occasions.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. VI, art. VII; N.H. CONST. of 1784 pt.
II, art. XCI.  In narrowing those occasions to “invasion” or “rebellion,” the U.S. Constitu-
tion went even further in protecting individual liberty.  Commentators were clear that the
Clause was designed to restrict powers that Congress might otherwise possess. See, e.g., R.
Carter Pittman, Jasper Yeates’s Notes on the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, 1787, 22 WM. &
MARY Q. 301, 307 (1965) (describing James Wilson’s characterization of the Clause as “re-
strictive of the general Legislative Powers of Congress”); see also The Massachusetts Conven-
tion, in 6 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: MASSACCHUSETTS 1107,
1358–59 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter The Massachusetts Convention]
(recounting Judge Sumner’s assertion to the Massachusetts Convention that the Clause
“was a restriction on Congress”); The Election of Convention Delegates, in 9 RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES: VIRGINIA 561, 1002 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds, 2000)
(remarks of George Nicholas) (“[I]n every other case [apart from rebellion or invasion],
Congress is restrained from suspending it.  In no other case can they suspend our laws—
and this is a most estimable security.”); cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, infra note 217 at *132 (observing R
that “this experiment [of suspension] ought only to be tried in cases of extreme
emergency”).
216 See supra Part I.A.
217 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132 (emphasis added). Blackstone further
linked the legislative power with current events by observing that English practice mim-
icked that of Rome, whose Senate resorted to the establishment of “a magistrate of abso-
lute authority, when they judged the republic in any imminent danger.” Id. (emphasis
added).  The view that the legislature should assess current circumstances was also evident
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In other words, the very benefit of entrusting the power to the legisla-
ture was so that it, rather than the Executive, would make the
real-time judgment about whether individual liberty should be sacri-
ficed.  Permitting Congress to suspend the privilege contingent upon
the later occurrence of rebellion or invasion is inconsistent with the
proposition that evaluating current events is the essence of the legisla-
tive task.218
That said, the Clause does not altogether rule out contingency
format suspension.  It provides that Congress can suspend the privi-
lege “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”219  Contrary to arguments of those who opposed delega-
tion during the Civil War and Reconstruction debates,220 Congress
need not wait until it is certain about the threat to public safety to
authorize emergency power.  Once Congress concludes that an inva-
sion or rebellion has occurred and that the resulting threat to public
safety is serious enough that suspension might be warranted, it may
pass a statute whose effectiveness depends upon the President’s judg-
ment.  The Clause may well treat the determination whether a particu-
lar security crisis is likely to require the exercise of emergency power
as a matter that the legislature must decide, but the Clause contem-
plates that the decision about whether and when the public safety ulti-
mately reaches that point is a matter that Congress can leave to the
President.221  Permitting Congress flexibility in this regard is protec-
in early nineteenth century England. See, e.g., J. L. DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF EN-
GLAND 304 (1821) (explaining that when the writ was suspended in England, “the execu-
tive power did not thus of itself stretch its own authority; the precaution was deliberated upon
and taken by the representatives of the people”) (emphasis added).  Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Ex parte Bollman can be read to take a similar approach: he asserts that the
decision to authorize emergency power “depends on political considerations, on which the
legislature is to decide.”  8 U.S. 75, 101 (1807).  The political considerations surrounding a
decision to suspend most naturally refer to the benefits and detriments that would result
from the execution of emergency power in a particular situation.
218 This is the position the Wisconsin Supreme Court took in its review of the Habeas
Corpus Act of 1863. See In re Oliver, 17 Wis. 681, 685–86 (1864). The court accepted the
general legitimacy of contingent legislation, id. at 685, but said that in the context of sus-
pension, the legislature “must itself judge when the emergency had arrived which justified”
suspending the privilege of the writ.  Id.; cf. STORY’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 13, § 1336, R
at 208–09 (“[A]s the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in
cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must
exclusively belong to that body.” (citation omitted)); Tyler, supra note 2, at 689 (arguing R
that the power to suspend belongs to Congress, which “must, at a minimum, timely declare
that current circumstances constitute a Rebellion or Invasion”).
219 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
220 For examples of such arguments, see supra notes 92, 103, 138 and accompanying R
text.
221 Cf. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825) (distinguishing “those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less inter-
est, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act
under such general provisions to fill up the details”).
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tive of civil liberty, for the Executive may be better suited than Con-
gress to making fine-tuned judgments about the state of public safety
in a particular location.222  After Congress makes its threshold deter-
minations, it can equip the President to respond with speed and re-
quire him to do so with geographical precision.223
B. Functional Analysis
A functional analysis cuts heavily in favor of reading the Clause to
restrict Congress’s ability to enact contingent suspension legislation.
As Part I describes, allocating suspension power to the legislature
guards civil liberty by checking executive excess; promoting transpar-
ent, vigorous, and representative debate; and harnessing the benefits
of legislative compromise.  Using our historical experiences with sus-
pension as case studies, this subpart considers whether we still realize
these structural benefits when Congress suspends the writ on a contin-
gent basis.
Before this subpart begins, a caveat is in order.  It is clear in what
follows that a statute like the 1871 Act, which was connected to the
then-current threat of the Ku Klux Klan, largely preserves those struc-
tural benefits.  While that connection underscores the importance of
timing in preserving those benefits, consistency with constitutional
structure does not trump consistency with constitutional text.  A stat-
ute coincident with an imminent rebellion may preserve the benefits
of allocating the decision to Congress, but the Suspension Clause pro-
hibits Congress from passing a suspension statute until invasion or re-
bellion actually occurs.224  The framers of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2
222 For example, it would have been cumbersome for Congress itself to attempt to
suspend the writ on a county-by-county basis in South Carolina during Reconstruction.
Relying on President Grant to make county-by-county judgments, however, enabled Con-
gress to confine the scope of the suspension. See Tyler, supra note 2, at 689 (“Permitting R
such fine-tuning by the executive and his officials on the ground . . . ultimately might lead
to lesser infringements on liberty interests than forcing Congress to define the scope of the
suspension being authorized at the outset, when Congress might err on the side of overin-
clusiveness.”); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. R
223 Note that while Congress can include a geographical restriction in a suspension
statute, as it did in the Ku Klux Klan Act, the Clause does not require it to do so. See infra
notes 304–10 and accompanying text. R
224 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (forbidding suspension “unless when in Cases of
Invasion or Rebellion the public Safety may require it”).  Note that the requirement of
actual invasion or rebellion is relevant even to those who might disagree that this language
imposes a temporal restraint upon Congress.  Even if the phrase is only a substantive limit,
it would prevent Congress from authorizing the President to suspend when invasion or
rebellion was imminent rather than actual.  This was another flaw in the statutes governing
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, which authorized the President to sus-
pend “in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof.”  Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch.
339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141, 154; Act of June 22, 1936, ch. 699, § 20, 49 Stat. 1807, 1812; Act of
Aug. 1, 1950, ch. 512, § 6, 64 Stat. 384, 386; Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, § 12, 39 Stat. 951,
955 (emphasis added); see Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, 691–92 (permitting
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made an apparently deliberate choice to specify the circumstances jus-
tifying emergency power even more narrowly than did the Massachu-
setts clause they used as a model,225 which limited the exercise of
emergency power to “the most urgent and pressing occasions.”226  In-
terpreting the Clause to permit suspension in the face of imminent
rebellion or invasion would disrupt that choice.  Thus—perhaps ironi-
cally—the 1871 Act illustrates why temporal proximity is crucial as a
matter of constitutional structure despite the fact that the Act runs
afoul of the precisely written constitutional text.
1. Checking the Executive
Recall that the primary rationale for allocating the suspension
power to Congress is the desire to check both executive excess and the
Executive’s institutional bias in favor of the power’s exercise.227  Re-
quiring the support of three institutional actors—the President, the
Senate, and the House—ensures that suspensions will occur more
rarely than they would if accomplished by executive order.  Thomas
Jefferson’s failed request for suspension in the Burr affair illustrates
this check at work.  Had Jefferson been able to unilaterally suspend,
he presumably would have done so; the need to seek legislative per-
mission checked his judgment and halted the process.  Indeed, the
need for the concurrence of both houses was an additional check on
that proposed suspension, for while the Senate quickly passed it, the
House summarily rejected it.  Abraham Lincoln, of course, refused to
acknowledge congressional authority, but the Reconstruction Con-
gress did check Ulysses Grant.  Had it been his choice, Grant presuma-
bly would have preferred to extend the suspension provision of the Ku
Klux Klan Act beyond its expiration date of June 10, 1872, as the sus-
pension orders he had issued under the original statute were still in
place when the sunset date arrived.228  But a bill to extend that provi-
sion—which, like its predecessor, operated by giving the President
conditional authority to suspend based on his judgment about
whether a rebellion existed and whether the public safety required
it—passed the Senate but died in the House.229
When a contingent suspension is removed in time from the
events that provoke the exercise of emergency power, Congress’s role
suspension in the Philippines “in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion”) (emphasis
added).  The Clause carefully limits suspension to an extant invasion or rebellion, and a
functional analysis cannot expand either its temporal or substantive constraint.
225 See Neuman, supra note 188, at 564 (explaining that the Suspension Clause in the R
U.S. Constitution was most directly modeled on the Massachusetts clause).
226 MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. VI, art. VII.
227 See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. R
228 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. R
229 See id.
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as a check on the Executive is far less effective.  Consider the territo-
rial statutes.  In a very general sense, the requirement of some legisla-
tive involvement made suspension less likely in any of those five
territories; if Congress had failed to include a delegation of authority
in the relevant organic statute, the Executive could not have sus-
pended the writ.  At the same time, inclusion of blanket suspension
authority removed in time from the provoking event does not make
suspension less likely in any specific case.  Once Congress vested the
President with the authority to suspend the writ in the Hawaiian terri-
tory, suspension was just as likely after the Japanese bombed Pearl
Harbor as it would have been in a constitutional system where the
President could unilaterally suspend.  The point is even clearer when
put in the context of a suspension that did not happen: had Congress
enacted a statute in 1790 authorizing the Executive to suspend when-
ever, in his judgment, an invasion or rebellion and the concomitant
threat to public safety required it, Jefferson probably would have sus-
pended seventeen years later when confronted with the Burr Conspir-
acy.  Once passed, “blank check” delegations of the territorial variety
remove the brake that the requirement of legislative involvement oth-
erwise puts on the Executive’s response to a particular security threat.
The institutional bias that naturally tilts toward suspension in close
cases is left free to operate.230
To be sure, the territorial suspension statutes are extreme.  Con-
gress not only passed them independently of any provoking event but
also gave the President and territorial governors literally no guidance
in determining what constituted an invasion, a rebellion, or a requi-
site threat to public safety.231  Whether a particular set of events con-
stitutes a rebellion or an invasion is a matter on which reasonable
people often disagree.232  Recall the disagreement in Congress about
230 Congress’s ability to pass legislation overriding the suspension does not provide the
same kind of brake on executive action.  Rather than working against the imposition of a
suspension, the force of legislative inertia will work against an override. See Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1388 (2001)
(“[O]nce Congress delegates power to the executive, it can reclaim its authority only if it
can overcome the substantial impediments built into the lawmaking process (including a
potential presidential veto) and enact further legislation.” (citations omitted)); see also
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 451–52 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“It is
no answer . . . to point out that a new statute, signed by the President or enacted over his
veto, could restore to Congress the power it now seeks to relinquish.”); Diller, supra note
20, at 647 (arguing that “Posner and Vermeule’s ‘political correction’ argument against R
the nondelegation doctrine underestimates just how hard it is for a later Congress to re-
verse broad delegations by an earlier Congress”).
231 This lack of guidance means that they are problematic even under the Court’s
conventional nondelegation doctrine, which requires Congress to articulate an intelligible
principle to guide a statute’s execution. See infra notes 289–92 and accompanying text. R
232 Consider that the similar question whether a particular military engagement
amounts to “hostilities” requiring congressional sanction under the War Powers Act is one
that has provoked dispute even among able lawyers within the Executive Branch. See
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whether the Burr Conspiracy was a rebellion,233 as well as the heated
dispute about whether Klan uprisings satisfied that definition.234  The
question whether an invasion or its threat continued in Hawaii after
the Battle of Midway was disputed,235 and Johnson’s implicit decision
that a rebellion continued for more than a year after the Confederate
surrender was questionable.236  A statute that specifically described
Congress’s view of the events that constitute an invasion or a rebellion
and a necessary threat to public safety would better constrain the Pres-
ident insofar as it would narrow the circumstances in which he could
declare the privilege suspended.  Even so, leaving the President alone
to judge how those standards apply to events at hand limits Congress’s
ability to check the Executive’s reaction to any specific case.
Imagine that Congress passed a statute providing that “the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended whenever the
United States or any of its territories is invaded by foreign terrorists
using a weapon of mass destruction and the exercise of emergency
detention authority is necessary to protect the public safety.”  In the
abstract, there is likely to be agreement that this is the kind of scena-
rio in which suspension may well be warranted.  But there is likely to
be disagreement about whether the statute justifies suspension in any
particular case.  Reasonable people can reach different conclusions
on the same set of facts about how a statutory standard applies.  Who
counts as a “terrorist”?237  What counts as an “invasion”?238  What
Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive
Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 65 (2011) (describing conflict between
lawyers in the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Justice about
whether military intervention in Libya amounted to “hostilities” under the Act).  The ques-
tion whether a given military intervention constitutes a war can be similarly controversial.
See, e.g., Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C.
327, 330–34 (1995) (describing controversy about whether military interventions in Haiti,
Korea, and Bosnia, among others, amounted to “wars” requiring congressional authoriza-
tion under the Constitution’s Declare War Clause).
233 See supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
234 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. R
235 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. R
236 See supra notes 124–29 and accompanying text. R
237 Cf. William Schinkel, On the Concept of Terrorism, 8 CONTEMP. POL. THEORY 176, 178
(2009) (“The main problem in defining or conceptualizing terrorism is political in nature.
That is to say that what counts as terrorism and what does not fall under its heading is
subject to political pressure and consequence.”); see also Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 127
F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Attempts to reach a fixed, universally accepted
definition of international terrorism have been frustrated both by changes in terrorist
methodology and the lack of any precise definition of the term ‘terrorism.’” (quoting
Flatow v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 17 (D.D.C. 1998)).
238 For example, one can imagine disagreement about whether or not a cyberattack
constitutes an “invasion.” Cf. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 74 (questioning whether Congress R
could treat illegal immigrants crossing the border from Mexico into the United States as an
“invasion”).
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counts as a “weapon of mass destruction”?239  How seriously must the
public safety be threatened before civil liberties are suspended?240
When a statute is passed months or years in advance of any identifi-
able crisis, Congress plays no role in making even preliminary factual
findings on these questions, thereby leaving unchecked the Execu-
tive’s incentive to interpret the statutory definitions aggressively.  Cer-
tainly, contingent statutes unconnected to an actual (or even
imminent) rebellion or invasion would do a better job of restraining
the Executive if they contained more detail.  But the check on the
Executive is still weak when he need not secure congressional authori-
zation for proceeding in any particular case.
While open-ended grants of contingent suspension authority
handicap Congress’s ability to check the Executive before a suspen-
sion is put in place, they do not in theory undercut Congress’s ability
to institute the back-end control of congressional oversight.  Recall
the statutory report-and-release requirements that the Civil War and
Reconstruction Congresses put in place to supervise the President’s
exercise of detention power.241  In theory, Congress could exercise
this sort of oversight function even when a statute is passed far in ad-
vance of any crisis.  As I explain below, however, Congress’s lack of
information about the nature of the threat makes it unlikely to in-
clude rigorous report-and-release requirements in statutes containing
open-ended grants of contingent suspension authority.242  The effec-
tiveness of oversight mechanisms is thus likely to be a moot point in
the case of abstract suspension statutes.  But even when
report-and-release requirements are present, they take effect after a
suspension is in place and preventative arrests have already been
made.  Congress’s most important role as the gatekeeper of emer-
gency power is to check its unleashing rather than to oversee its
exercise.  Congress’s ability to impose back-end controls on an
open-ended, contingency format suspension does not compensate for
its near abandonment of front-end controls on the President’s exer-
cise of authority.
239 See W. SETH CARUS, DEFINING “WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION” 6 (2012), available
at http://wmdcenter.dodlive.mil/files/2006/01/OP8.pdf (asserting that there are “more
than 50 definitions [of the term ‘weapon of mass destruction’] with some official standing
in the United States and elsewhere”).
240 For example, both Thomas Jefferson and the Senate concluded that the Burr Con-
spiracy sufficiently threatened the public safety for purposes of the Suspension Clause.
The House of Representatives questioned—and ultimately rejected—that judgment. See
supra note 78 and accompanying text. R
241 See supra notes 82–85, 136 and accompanying text. R
242 See infra 267–68 and accompanying text. R
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2. Transparent, Vigorous, and Representative Debate
As discussed in Part I, another benefit of allocating suspension
authority to Congress is that the legislative process is more likely to
generate vigorous, transparent debates that account for a range of
views about whether suspension is required to handle a given security
crisis.  Compare the process of executive decision making.  It is un-
clear how much internal Executive Branch debate preceded Lincoln’s
unilateral decision to empower military subordinates to suspend the
writ shortly after the Civil War’s start.243  Even if he consulted with his
closest advisers, that group was both more limited in number than the
hundreds of members of Congress and more monolithic in its politi-
cal views.244  At the end of the day, moreover, Lincoln’s judgment was
the only one that mattered; he was not bound to accept the counsel of
his advisors.  By contrast, a decision subjected to the legislative process
must command the support of a majority in both houses where both
political parties, along with their internal factions, are represented.  It
is also a process in which regional interests have both a voice and a
vote.  The first location in which Lincoln unilaterally suspended the
writ was Maryland.  Shortly thereafter, Senator Kennedy of Maryland
complained that he was “not informed of the reasons upon which this
writ has been suspended in any particular case in the State of Mary-
land” and that “[i]n [his] judgment, there was no immediate neces-
sity” for Lincoln’s suspension of the writ in his state.245  Many
Marylanders surely shared this sentiment, but it was not an argument
Kennedy was able to make before the fact.246
The Burr Conspiracy suspension debates were vigorous, represen-
tative, and at least partially transparent.247  Indeed, disagreement be-
tween the House and Senate about both predicates—whether a
rebellion existed and whether the public safety required it—caused
243 Confederate forces attacked Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. MCPHERSON, supra
note 124, at 158.  Fifteen days later, Lincoln issued an executive order authorizing General R
Winfield Scott or his officer in command to suspend the writ between Philadelphia and
Washington. See 8 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 3219. David Herbert Donald R
notes that when Lincoln suspended the writ nationwide on September 24, 1862, “[t]o the
President this seemed such a routine matter that he did not even mention it to the cabi-
net. . . .  Lincoln’s proclamation was simply designed to codify . . . War Department rules.”
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 380 (1995).
244 Even if they were a “team of rivals,” see DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS:
THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005), the members of Lincoln’s Cabinet still
shared his party affiliation.
245 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1861).
246 Cf. Clark, supra note 230, at 1374 (emphasizing that the nondelegation doctrine R
“not only furthers the separation of powers, but also safeguards federalism” insofar as it
ensures that states are represented in the legislative process).
247 The debates were only partially transparent because, while the House proceedings
were open to the public, the Senate conducted its discussion in closed session.
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the measure to fail.248  The 1863 and 1871 statutes similarly provoked
intense debates in which members of Congress voiced a variety of po-
litical and regional views about whether suspension was the appropri-
ate constitutional response to the crisis at hand.249  The 1871 debates
are a particularly good example because the existence of a presiden-
tially imposed suspension order did not taint them.  Members of Con-
gress engaged in a heated argument about whether Klan activity
constituted a rebellion, expressing a range of conflicting views on the
question.250  They also closely considered whether Klan violence
posed a sufficiently serious threat to warrant suspension.  Because the
statute embodied a preliminary legislative judgment that suspension
was likely to be necessary, Grant’s suspension orders certainly did not
represent “the judgment of one” on the matter.251
Again, however, the abstract delegations of authority to the Presi-
dent in the territorial statutes eliminated the benefit of legislative de-
liberation about whether suspension was an appropriate response to a
crisis.  At the time Congress enacted the organic statutes, it could have
debated (although apparently did not debate) the abstract question
whether it is constitutional or even wise to give the President the abil-
ity to suspend concomitant with constitutional limits.  But that discus-
sion would have resembled one that framers of a constitution might
have about whether the executive or the legislature should possess the
authority to suspend.  It would not have been a deliberation about
whether a particular circumstance warranted the exercise of emer-
gency power.  Roosevelt’s decision to suspend in Hawaii was, for all
practical purposes, like Lincoln’s judgment in 1861—the judgment of
one man.
3. Legislative Compromise
A unilateral executive order may reflect a relatively unfiltered
policy impulse, but a bill cannot successfully run the gamut of bicam-
eralism and presentment without being subjected to the tempering
effect of legislative compromise.252  In the context of suspension, the
need for compromise tends to narrow a suspension’s scope.  Both the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 reflect
this disciplining influence.
248 See supra note 78. R
249 See Part II.C.2–3.
250 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. R
251 As explained above, however, while enactment at the threshold of a crisis may pre-
serve many of the benefits of the constitutional structure, the language of the Clause none-
theless requires Congress to stay its hand until actual rebellion or invasion occurs. See supra
notes 224–26 and accompanying text. R
252 See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text. R
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The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 was a fusion of two bills: H.R. 362
and H.R. 591.253  As initially introduced, neither bill had a sunset pro-
vision, and both bills gave the President the authority to suspend the
writ nationwide if he saw fit.254  Efforts to impose temporal and geo-
graphic restrictions on the President’s suspension authority failed,255
and the enacted statute gave the President the same broad authority
to define the contours of the suspension.  Thus, the statute reflected
no compromise on the scope of the President’s authority to suspend,
and in this respect it manifested the distorting influence of Lincoln’s
existing suspension order.  If the statute was to avoid condemning
Lincoln’s asserted authority, it could not give him less than he had
already assumed.  That said, the 1863 Act reflected some accommoda-
tion of competing views insofar as sections 2 and 3 of the Act imposed
significant restrictions on the Executive’s ability to detain once the
writ was suspended.  The House appeared ambivalent about the im-
portance of these provisions for prisoner release.  On the one hand,
the provisions that became sections 2 and 3 of the Act initially ap-
peared in H.R. 362.256  On the other hand, H.R. 591, which contained
253 Both H.R. 362 and H.R. 591 passed the House and Senate.  The Committee of the
Conference on H.R. 591 essentially fused the Senate’s versions of these two bills into H.R.
591, which, as passed, became the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. See Sellery, supra note 86, at R
262.  The Senate version of H.R. 362 was close to the House version; it was ultimately
reflected in sections 1 to 3 of the 1863 Act, those dealing with the President’s suspension
and detention power.  The Senate version of H.R. 591 differed significantly from the
House version insofar as it deleted the suspension provision and rendered the bill exclu-
sively about the regulation of judicial proceedings against federal officers for extraordinary
arrests.  Sections 4 to 7 of the 1863 Act essentially codified these changes.  See id. at 262.
For a description of the modifications the Senate made to the regulation of such suits, see
id. at 253–55.
254 H.R. 362 provided, in relevant part:
That during the existence of this rebellion the President shall be, and is
hereby, invested with authority to declare the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, at such times, and in such places, and with regard
to such persons, as in his judgment the public safety may require.
Id. at 248.  H.R. 591 provided, in relevant part:
That it is and shall be lawful for the President of the United States, when-
ever, . . . in his judgment, by reason of ‘rebellion or invasion the public
safety may require it,’ to suspend by proclamation the privileges of the writ
of habeas corpus  . . . throughout the United States or in any part
thereof . . . .
Id. at 243–44.
255 For example, Representative Biddle proposed amending H.R. 362 to limit any sus-
pension to “the period of twelve months, or until the next meeting of Congress” and to
those areas “wherein the laws of the United States are by force opposed, and the execution
thereof obstructed.” Id. at 241.  In the Senate, Senator Cowan proposed amending H.R.
362 to authorize the President to suspend only when Congress was not in session and only
until Congress next met. Id. at 243–44.
256 See H.R. 362, 37th Cong. §§ 1–2 (1862).  The only significant change made to these
sections in the enacted statute was the addition of a proviso conditioning release under the
act on an oath of allegiance to the United States. See Act of Mar. 3,
1863, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-2\CRN201.txt unknown Seq: 62 10-JAN-14 11:01
312 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:251
no restrictions of any kind on the President’s authority, sailed through
the House, passing on the same day it was introduced.257  In the Sen-
ate, by contrast, Lyman Trumbull, the driving force behind the legisla-
tion in that chamber, emphasized the release provisions as an
important counterbalance to the suspension provision.258  These sig-
nificant restrictions on the Executive’s detention power did not drop
out of the Senate version of the bill despite the fact that a majority of
the Republicans in the Senate objected to them on the ground that
“political prisoners might secure their liberation too quickly for the
good of the country.”259  It seems safe to say that these restrictions
were a concession necessary to the statute’s passage.
The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 also reflected compromise, and
because a unilateral executive order did not distort the process, this
Act provides a better case study for how the legislative process can
narrow the scope of a suspension bill.  Significantly, the bill was
amended to tighten its definition of a rebellion.  The bill as reported
from the committee provided that the violence must “set at defiance
the constituted authorities of such State.”260  A House amendment ad-
ded the requirement that the violence must defy not only state author-
ities but also federal authorities present in the district.  As
Representative Shellabarger, the bill’s sponsor, explained, this amend-
ment “widen[ed] the state of violence and of danger required before
the [suspension provision] can be resorted to”261 and accommodated
“the views of members desirous of effecting legislation of this kind.”262
Another important amendment incorporated the limitations of the
section 2 of the 1863 Act—those relating to the discharge of prisoners
257 See Sellery, supra note 86, at 251 (recounting that the bill was both introduced and R
passed on December 8, 1862, making it “the most expeditious passage that a habeas corpus
bill ever had during the civil war”).  Thaddeus Stevens, a Republican whom Sellery charac-
terized as “the aggressive and radical leader in the House,” sponsored H.R. 591. Id. at 247.
258 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1092 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (defending
the bill on the ground that the prisoner “is not to be left there without remedy, but is to
have an opportunity, at the very first term of the court, to obtain his discharge, unless the
facts are such as to warrant further proceedings against him”).
259 Sellery, supra note 86, at 259.  Sellery explains that Senator Collamer moved to R
strike out the last two sections and that his effort “would have succeeded had not the
Democrats and Unionists rallied to the assistance of Trumbull.  The motion failed by the
close vote of 18 to 20.” Id. at 260.
260 H.R. 320, 42d Cong. § 4 (1871).
261 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1871).  Representative Shellabarger went
on to observe that the violence “must be so very imposing as to defy both the authority of
the State and the authority of the United States; that is, of the marshals of the United
States present in the district.” Id.  That same amendment also narrowed the authority con-
ferred by omitting language from the initial bill that would have authorized the President
not only to suspend the writ of habeas corpus but also to declare martial law. See id.
262 Id.
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other than prisoners of war—into the current bill.263  The Reconstruc-
tion Congress, like the Civil War Congress before it, recognized that
these restrictions significantly curtailed the President’s suspension au-
thority but considered their addition crucial to securing the bill’s
passage.264
The need to ensure majority buy-in drives not only specific con-
cessions made along the way but also how the bill is initially framed.
In the context of Reconstruction, where there was no existing suspen-
sion order and a vigorous discussion about whether a rebellion existed
at all, it would have been impossible to pass a delegation statute as
broad as that contained in the 1863 Act.  The starting proposal was
not, as it had been for the 1863 Act, to give the President the
“authori[ty] to suspend the privilege of the writ . . . in any case
throughout the United States” for as long as he deemed it neces-
sary.265  Instead, the starting—and ending—point was permitting
Grant to suspend only within the limits of the district “under the sway
of rebellion,” and even then only after commanding insurgents to dis-
perse.  His authority to suspend lasted for just over a year.266
Open-ended assignments of contingent decision-making author-
ity, like those in the territorial statutes, are relatively insulated from
the narrowing influence of compromise.  It is impossible to know why
Congress granted such sweeping suspension authority in the territo-
rial statutes.  Even though Congress passed them in the abstract, it
could still have included a restriction like a sunset clause.  More spe-
cific compromises, however, like concessions made on the definition
of an invasion or a rebellion or the suspension’s geographic scope, are
difficult to reach in a situation where Congress’s goal is to draft legis-
lation broad enough to capture a range of events, some foreseen and
some unimagined, that might occur in the future.267  When it comes
263 On April 6, 1871, the House agreed to an amendment proposed by Representative
Garfield of Ohio that would render the section of the 1863 Act relating “to the discharge of
prisoners other than prisoners of war, and to the penalty for refusing to obey the order of
the court, shall be in full force so far as the same are applicable to the provisions of this
section.” Id. at 521.  This language remained in the enacted statute. See Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 14.
264 Senator Edmunds, explaining the bill after it emerged from the Judiciary Commit-
tee, observed that “[i]n substance and fact it leaves a Federal habeas corpus in effect, al-
though not in precise form, still operating for a limited time. . . .  About all that we do is to
authorize him to proclaim that he has suspended it, and then, as soon as he has caught
anybody, to report him and hand him over to the Federal judge.” CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 568 (1871).  Edmunds himself would have preferred to give the President
more power but said that the Committee did not think it prudent to change the House’s
language. See id.
265 Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755.
266 See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22. § 5, 17 Stat. 14–15.
267 Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 793 (2008) (observing that in the age of
terrorist attacks, “[t]he ways to disrupt our life and laws are so many and unforeseen that
the Court should not attempt even some general catalogue of crises that might occur”).
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to compromise, the devil is often in the details.  For example, it was
knowledge that the rebellion at issue during Reconstruction was
aimed at the overthrow of both state and federal authority that ena-
bled those desirous of a narrower suspension to successfully “widen[ ]
the state of violence and of danger required before
the . . . [suspension provision] can be resorted to.”268  It is also un-
clear that Congress would have included report-and-release provisions
in either the Civil War or Reconstruction statutes if it had lacked in-
formation about the nature of the threat.  Understanding the threat
permits Congress to determine whether publicly disclosing the names
of the detained would compromise national security; the wisdom of
requiring the quick release of those not charged similarly depends
upon the kind of danger they pose.  For example, Congress may be
less willing to order the release of a member of a sophisticated organi-
zation intent on further attack than someone from a looser-knit group
with members whose loyalty is more easily broken.  Nor is compromise
on the geographic limits of a suspension, like that reached in the Re-
construction statute, possible when the nature and location of an inva-
sion or a rebellion are unknown.269  In sum, compromise is far less
likely to narrow the scope of a statute passed in the abstract than one
passed in response to a specific event.  And because the scope of an
order issued pursuant to a suspension statute tends to track the au-
thority granted by the statute itself,270 the consequence of a more
268 See supra note 261 and accompanying text. R
269 That said, the Philippines Organic Act contained at least a soft geographic restric-
tion insofar as its language authorized suspension “wherever during such period the neces-
sity for such suspension shall exist.” See Philippines Organic Act, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691,
692 (1902) (emphasis added).  While this language left room for a territory-wide order (as
opposed to the stricter district-by-district limitation of the Reconstruction statute), it did
instruct the territorial governor and the President to consider carefully the regional scope
of any suspension imposed.
270 The delegation to Lincoln was extraordinarily broad and so was the suspension
order issued under it: nationwide and of indefinite duration.  Johnson finally withdrew it
more than three years after Congress had passed the Act and more than a year after the
rebellion had been suppressed. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.  President R
Franklin D. Roosevelt approved a suspension in Hawaii that was as broad as the statute
permitted it to be: it covered the whole Hawaiian territory and was of indefinite duration,
ultimately lasting almost three years. See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.  The R
Philippines Organic Act, by contrast, was more restrictive and accordingly yielded a nar-
rower executive order.  The Act permitted suspension “wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist,” see Philippines Organic Act, 32 Stat. 691, 692 (em-
phasis added), and the order approved by Roosevelt suspended the writ in only two prov-
inces. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.  The Reconstruction statute was even R
more specific insofar as it contained a sunset clause and authorized suspension only in
districts where the Klan had effectively taken control.  Consistent with the statute, Grant
suspended the writ in nine counties, and those orders stayed in place no longer than nine
months because that is when their statutory authority expired. See supra notes 133, 144 and R
accompanying text.  This is not to say that the Executive never shows self-restraint: Grant
revoked one of his suspension orders two weeks after issuing it. See supra note 147 and R
accompanying text.  The historical pattern nonetheless strongly suggests that the prospect
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broadly worded statute is a broadly worded order and thus a greater
infringement upon civil liberty.
4. Structural Benefits the Constitution Forgoes
Those who defended delegation during the Civil War and Recon-
struction debates asserted that giving the decision to the President
preserved the effectiveness of emergency power.  They echoed many
of the same arguments made by those who supported Lincoln’s asser-
tion of inherent suspension authority.  Defenders of delegation ar-
gued that it would be impractical for Congress to assess the public
safety because the President was better situated to gather and respond
to that information.271  They pointed out that quick action may be
necessary to contain a crisis and the Executive can act more quickly
than the legislature.  And while Congress is not always in session, the
Executive is always available.272  In short, they maintained that empow-
ering the Executive in advance to suspend the privilege of the writ
arms him with the authority that national security may demand as
soon as a crisis hits.
Congress’s hands are not tied as firmly as this argument suggests.
Those in the antidelegation camp insisted that Congress alone could
make the decision about what the public safety required.  The Clause,
however, allows Congress some flexibility.  Congress need only decide
that the public safety “may require” suspension; the Clause permits
Congress to leave the final decision in that regard to the President.273
Thus, Congress can capture at least some of the Executive’s speed and
proximity to the crisis by delegating contingent authority on that
question.  Nonetheless, it is undeniable that requiring Congress to de-
cide that an invasion or a rebellion has occurred and to reach a tenta-
tive conclusion about the seriousness of the threat to public safety
does make for a slower process than one entrusted entirely to the Ex-
ecutive.  Given that the Executive’s institutional capacity for speed is
the most compelling argument in favor of giving the President a lead-
ing role, it should be taken seriously.
The primary—though perhaps to some unsatisfactory—response
is that the Constitution does not place a premium on speed in the
decision to suspend the civil rights of those within the protection of
U.S. law.  Rendering the decision legislative reflects a constitutional
preference for the constraints of the legislative process despite the at-
of a limited suspension order is far greater when limitations are imposed by statute, as
Executives are prone to exercise the full authority granted them.
271 See supra note 104–05 and accompanying text. R
272 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. R
273 See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text. R
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tendant delay.274  The point is to check the Executive, and loosening
his hand runs at cross-purposes to that aim.  Congress may be able to
give the Executive open-ended contingent authority—or he may pos-
sess inherent authority—to use other tools, like the deployment of
troops, to respond immediately to an attack on American soil.275  Sus-
pending civil liberties, however, falls into a different category.276
History blunts at least somewhat the concern about the conse-
quences of this choice, for experience does not indicate that commit-
ting the decision to the legislature inevitably stymies resort to
emergency power.  We can surmise that Parliament in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and founding-era state legislatures acted
with sufficient speed in suspending the writ, as there was apparently
no discussion of reallocating the power to the king or governor to
preserve suspension’s effectiveness.  On the contrary, there was firm
resolve during that period to reserve the power entirely to the legisla-
ture.  We also know that Congress has demonstrated the ability to
quickly refuse a suspension request.  Jefferson asked the Senate for a
suspension on January 23, 1807, to address the Burr Conspiracy.  The
Senate passed a bill on the same day, and the House roundly rejected
it three days later.277  One might be tempted to point to the two-year
debate about whether to authorize Lincoln to suspend the writ as evi-
dence of Congress’s excessive slowness.  Given, however, that the Pres-
ident had already suspended the writ of his own accord, there was no
particular reason for Congress to rush.  The Reconstruction Congress,
which was not acting in the shadow of an existing suspension order,
moved much faster.  Grant requested emergency legislation on March
23.278  A bill including a suspension provision was introduced in the
House five days later,279 and the resulting statute, the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871, became law on April 20.280  The process took twenty-eight
days from start to finish, and given that Grant did not exercise the
suspension authority for another six months, swifter action was pre-
sumably unnecessary.  Of course, it is impossible to say how quickly
274 See supra notes 20–35 and accompanying text. R
275 See, e.g., Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 264 (authorizing the President to
call forth the state militia “whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent
danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian tribe”).
276 Cf. Hamburger, supra note 56, at 1911 (noting that historically, “even in the most R
alarming circumstances, an executive could not detain persons who were within protection
unless it had legislative authorization and suspension”).
277 See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. R
278 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 4081–82 (Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to R
the Senate and House of Representatives, March 23, 1871).  He did not ask explicitly for a
suspension; he asked for “such legislation as in the judgment of Congress shall effectually
secure life, liberty, and property and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United
States.” Id. at 4081.
279 H.R. 320, 42d Cong. (1871).
280 Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 14.
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Congress would have acted if Grant had asked for an immediate sus-
pension, just as it is impossible to say how quickly Congress would
have responded to a similar report from Roosevelt during World War
II.  Legislatures may have responded effectively in the past to occa-
sions warranting emergency power, but there is no guarantee that
they will always do so.
In the end, one can say only that as between the risks of infring-
ing civil liberties too easily and not easily enough, the Constitution
assumes the latter risk.  In considering the extent of that risk, it is
worth observing that the President might not be wholly without re-
course during an emergency when Congress is unable to meet.  He
may have the option of acting first and asserting a necessity defense or
seeking indemnity later.281
C. Summary
The Suspension Clause curbs Congress’s ability to give the Presi-
dent contingent power.  Both the historical backdrop of the Clause
and the structural values at stake militate in favor of interpreting it to
permit Congress to pass a suspension statute only when an invasion or
rebellion actually occurs.  The core role of Congress is that of making
the preliminary judgment whether suspending the privilege of the
writ is a necessary response in the circumstances surrounding a partic-
ular instance of alleged invasion or rebellion.  Sweeping contingent
delegations like those found in the territorial statutes undercut every
structural benefit that the constitutional allocation of authority is de-
signed to achieve.
To be sure, this means that the Suspension Clause stands as an
exception to the nondelegation doctrine, which emphasizes the ex-
tremely broad leeway that Congress enjoys in assigning responsibilities
to the Executive Branch.  The lion’s share of both cases and academic
debate about that broad leeway, however, has occurred in the context
of statutes that charge administrative agencies with executing routine
281 See supra note 10; see also J. G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN R
147 (rev. ed. 1951) (“If a commander disregards the usual guarantees, making summary
seizures, arrests, and imprisonments, his proceedings may, indeed, ultimately be held justi-
fiable, but he takes a risk.  His action is reviewable by the courts, and in case of any in-
fringement upon private rights beyond the point reasonably warranted by the necessities of
the situation, he may be held liable in a civil or even in a criminal action.”); cf. Moyer v.
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85–86 (1909) (holding that necessity excused a governor from civil
liability for preventatively detaining suspects in order to put down an insurrection); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 36–37 (1866) (argument of counsel) (maintaining that whenever
any person, including a military commander, invokes necessity to justify otherwise illegal
acts, “[t]he correctness of his conclusion must be judged by courts and juries, whenever
the acts and the alleged necessity are drawn in question”); Shapiro, supra note 8, at 72 n.53 R
(expressing “little doubt” that the President would act in the face of necessity when Con-
gress was not in session and that “Congress would later seek to ratify his action”).
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social or economic policies.282  The Court’s reluctance to
second-guess Congress’s judgment about how much authority to grant
the Executive in the formation of social and economic policy is similar
to its reluctance to second-guess Congress’s judgment about the con-
tent of social or economic policy.  In the context of the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses, rationality review reflects the Court’s
conclusion that so long as a statute does not employ suspect classifica-
tions or restrict fundamental rights, the choice of legislative means
and ends belongs almost entirely to Congress.283  In the delegation
context, Congress’s freedom to act on a contingent basis284 and the
notoriously lax “intelligible principle” test285 reflects the Court’s con-
clusion that the decision of how to carry out routine social and eco-
nomic policy belongs almost entirely to Congress.  Taken together,
these two lines of cases underscore that the Constitution generally en-
trusts Congress with the primary responsibility not only for formulat-
ing social and economic policy but also for deciding how much to rely
on other branches for its implementation.
Yet the fact that Congress enjoys broad leeway in most cases does
not mean that this freedom applies across the board.  The analogy to
due process and equal protection review is instructive.  In that con-
text, certain types of laws—namely those restricting fundamental
rights or employing suspect classifications—merit heightened scrutiny
because of the particular constitutional guarantees they implicate.
Just as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (among others) limit
Congress’s otherwise expansive power to shape the content of legisla-
tion, certain constitutional provisions might limit Congress’s other-
wise expansive power to implement legislation as it sees fit.286
282 Representative cases in this line address the regulation of foreign trade, see Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 690–92 (1892), setting war-time price ceilings for commodities, see
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 421, 426–27 (1944), promulgating sentencing guide-
lines for federal criminal offenses, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 413–15
(1989), and setting national ambient air quality standards for ozone and particulate mat-
ter, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001).
283 See Manning, supra note 29, at 2447–48 (describing the “very strong presumption of R
validity” that the Court applies to such statutes and its refusal either to question legislative
ends or to “insist[ ] on a substantial means-ends fit”).
284 See The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813) (“[W]e can see no sufficient reason,
why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809,
either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.”).
285 See J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928).  The Court
has held statutes unconstitutional for violating the nondelegation doctrine only twice. See
Diller, supra note 20, at 588 (referencing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 R
U.S. 495, 542 (1935) and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415 (1935)).
286 Arguments for a more demanding nondelegation doctrine have been made in a
variety of contexts, including Congress’s power to declare war, see N.J. Peace Action v.
Obama, 379 F. App’x 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), to render conduct criminal, see Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165–66 (1991), and to develop an adequate substitute for
habeas review of executive detention, see Diller, supra note 20, at 588.  The Court has re- R
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The Suspension Clause is such a provision.  As recounted in Part
I, the Constitution allocates suspension authority to Congress both
out of fear that the Executive would abuse it and because the gravity
of a suspension’s impact upon civil liberty renders the safeguards of
the legislative process particularly important.  The Constitution’s wari-
ness of executive power, combined with the relatively exacting ap-
proach traditionally taken to statutes affecting fundamental rights,
support a more demanding application of the nondelegation doctrine
in this context than in the vast field of social and economic legislation
in which the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the author-
ity to implement its Article I powers as it sees fit.  This approach to the
Clause does not challenge the premise of the nondelegation doctrine;
rather, it fits into the well-established distinction between routine leg-
islative policy choices and legislation affecting fundamental rights.
V
SUSPENSION AND SPECIFICITY
The Suspension Clause severely limits the circumstances under
which Congress can initiate a regime of emergency power.  Part IV
argued that this limit is partly expressed in the Clause’s requirement
that Congress act only “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion” rather
than in anticipation of them.287  One might also insist, as many did in
the nineteenth century, that the unique nature of emergency power
requires Congress to give the President relatively detailed guidance
with respect to a suspension’s scope.  This argument is not directed at
jected the claim that taxing authority is an area in which a more demanding standard
should govern delegation. See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 221 (1989).
It has reserved the question whether “something more than an ‘intelligible principle’ is
required when Congress authorizes another Branch to promulgate regulations that con-
template criminal sanctions” because “regulations of this sort pose a heightened risk to
individual liberty.” See Touby, 500 U.S. at 165–66.  It has not addressed arguments pressed
in other areas.  The Court has, however, expressly held that a more lenient standard ap-
plies when the delegation coincides with an area in which the Executive possesses some
inherent authority. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768–69 (1996) (holding
that the President’s authority as Commander in Chief made it permissible for Congress to
give him unusually wide discretion in the context of a court martial); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936) (holding that where foreign affairs are
concerned, Congress may “either leave the exercise of the power to [the President’s] un-
restricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than that which has always
been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs”).  If the scale can slide down in
areas in which the Constitution renders the Executive particularly powerful, it might slide
up in areas in which the Constitution’s allocation of authority reflects particular wariness
of executive power; cf. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST
PERIOD 1789–1801, at 247 (1997) (opining that “it may be that delegation is more suspect,
and must accordingly be more narrowly defined, when the authority in question is one the
Framers specifically meant to keep out of executive hands”). But cf. Diller, supra note 20, at R
635 (“The intriguing notion of a sliding scale of delegable powers, with some powers rank-
ing lower on the scale of delegability, has received only limited attention.”).
287 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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Congress’s ability to legislate on a contingent basis.  It is instead a
claim that something more than the standard “intelligible princi-
ple”288 must confine the Executive’s discretion in this context, regard-
less whether a statute suspends the writ outright or in advance.  This
Part argues that no such heightened standard applies.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the standard “intelligible
principle” test does impose some limit, even if a modest one, upon the
scope of suspension legislation.  Delegations as sweeping as those
found in the territorial statutes—delegations passed outside the con-
text of any particular crisis and that gave the President literally no
guidance in deciding when the prerequisites for suspension were
met—likely fail even that forgiving test.289  In other words, these stat-
utes should trouble even those who reject Part IV’s argument for a
timing requirement.  The breadth of such legislation has the effect of
resetting the constitutional baseline by statute.  The Constitution gives
Congress the authority to suspend the writ in the event of a rebellion
or an invasion when the public safety requires it.  A delegation like
those in the territorial statutes effectively says the opposite: that the
President shall have the authority to suspend the writ in the event of a
rebellion or an invasion when the public safety requires it.  Such a
statute is the equivalent of one that says, in total, “the President shall
have the power to regulate commerce among the several states”290 or
288 See supra note 187 and accompanying text. R
289 Gary Lawson has argued that the nondelegation doctrine does not apply to Con-
gress in its regulation of territories and federal property because the separation of powers
principle enforced by that doctrine derives from Article I’s requirement that legislation
passed under it be not only necessary but also proper. See Lawson, supra note 183, at R
392–93.  Article IV imposes no requirement that legislation enacted pursuant to it be
proper; thus, it does not incorporate the background norms of constitutional structure
into territorial legislation, id., instead giving Congress “a free hand with respect to the
structure of the territorial governments it creates.”  Lawson, supra note 180, at 876.  Con- R
gress’s freedom in this regard means, among other things, that it can pass “laws instructing
executive agents to make rules unconstrained by meaningful standards.”  Lawson, supra
note 183, at 393; see also DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CON- R
GRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 187 (1993) (suggesting that Article IV’s
location “outside the first three Articles of the Constitution, which focus on separation of
powers,” provides some support for the proposition that the Constitution does not impose
the same limits on Congress’s ability to delegate when acting under the Territories and
Property Clause).  A full exploration of the nature of Congress’s unique authority over
territories, federal property, and the District of Columbia is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.  For present purposes, it is sufficient to flag the issue and to observe that the “intelligi-
ble principle” test would limit Congress’s ability to enact similarly sweeping delegations of
authority to suspend the writ within the boundaries of the fifty states.  It is also worth
noting that even if the standard nondelegation doctrine does not constrain Congress in its
regulation of federal territories, the Suspension Clause does. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the Suspension Clause “has full effect at Guanta´namo
Bay”).  Thus, the Clause’s proscription of suspension legislation in the absence of actual
invasion or rebellion, see supra Part IV, applies to federal territories and property.
290 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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“the President shall have the power to declare war.”291  Despite its le-
niency, the nondelegation doctrine does not maintain that Congress
can change the constitutional allocation of power by shifting the sum
of its power in a particular area to the Executive.292  This legislation is
problematic, therefore, even assuming that Congress’s ability to legis-
late on a contingent basis is unfettered.293
Assume, however, a statute that would survive a standard nondele-
gation analysis.  Does the Suspension Clause require Congress to curb
the President’s discretion in ways that the bare separation of powers
principle would not?  Specific questions surfaced repeatedly in con-
gressional debates.  Must Congress confine the President’s suspension
decision (and concomitantly his detention authority) by imposing a
sunset clause or geographic limits?294  Must it prohibit the President
from subdelegating the authority to declare a suspension effective?295
Must it limit the grant of preventative detention authority under a
suspension statute to the President and members of his cabinet, or
may it permit any executive official, state or federal, to detain prison-
ers indefinitely on mere suspicion?296  Of the seven federal statutes,
only the one passed during Reconstruction contained a sunset clause,
and only that statute and the Philippines Organic Act contained any
geographic restriction on the President’s power to proclaim and exer-
291 See id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
292 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (stating that the
Constitution “permits no delegation of [legislative] powers”).  To be sure, the words “inva-
sion,” “rebellion,” and “public safety” might be thought to give the President at least some
guidance.  But even apart from the fact that they confer the sum total of Congress’s consti-
tutional power, the scope of these statutes is reason to expect substantial guidance from
Congress. See id. at 475 (“[T]he degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies ac-
cording to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.  While Congress need not
provide any direction to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define ‘country
elevators’ . . . it must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the
entire national economy.” (internal citations omitted)).
293 The Supreme Court has observed that context can render permissible even a
broadly worded statute. See, e.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26
(1943) (summarily rejecting the contention that a public interest standard was so “vague
and indefinite” as to violate the nondelegation doctrine given that it was modified by the
purposes, requirements, and context of the statute); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States,
287 U.S. 12, 25 (1932) (upholding the “public interest” standard because it “is not a con-
cept without ascertainable criteria, but has direct relation” to the purposes, requirements,
and context of the act).  This is no less true in the case of suspension.  For example, the
suspension provision in the 1871 Act did not expressly connect Klan activities to the “rebel-
lion” with which the statute was concerned.  But the statute’s popular title (“The Ku Klux
Klan Act”) and the context in which Congress passed it (hearings about Klan violence in
the South) made clear that the power granted to the President was to address that particu-
lar uprising.  Proximity to a crisis can be important, therefore, even in a standard nondele-
gation analysis.
294 See supra notes 99, 108 and accompanying text. R
295 See supra notes 119, 140 and accompanying text. R
296 See supra notes 76, 120–22 and accompanying text. R
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cise emergency detention authority.297  None of the statutes pre-
vented subdelegation of either the suspension or detention power.
These omissions were controversial, but they are only fatal if the Sus-
pension Clause requires their presence.  And in contrast to the timing
requirement, which has textual support,298 the Clause is devoid of any
language requiring any of them.
Eighteenth-century parliamentary and state suspension statutes
almost always included sunset clauses.299  The Massachusetts Constitu-
tion, the first to contain a Suspension Clause, memorialized this re-
quirement by providing that the writ could be suspended “for a
limited time, not exceeding twelve months.”300  Despite the fact that it
was modeled on the Massachusetts provision,301 the federal Suspen-
sion Clause contains no such limitation.302  That is not to say that Arti-
cle I, Section 9 of the Constitution permits indefinite suspension.
When either the invasion or rebellion ends or the threat to public
safety ceases, the warrant to suspend does as well.303  It permits sus-
pension only during a rebellion or an invasion and while the public
safety requires it; thus, once the rebellion or invasion ends, or the
threat to public safety diminishes, the warrant for suspension ceases.
Indeed, even if an outright suspension contained a sunset clause, Con-
gress would be obligated to rescind the statute if any of the conditions
justifying suspension ceased before the statute expired.  A sunset
clause might be a prudent measure insofar as a statutory cap sets the
force of inertia against rather than for suspension—inaction, the
course of least resistance, results in expiration.  But regardless
297 The bill proposing suspension in response to the Burr Conspiracy contained no
geographic restriction but did expire after three months. See supra note 75 and accompa- R
nying text.
298 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. R
299 See supra notes 52, 62 and accompanying text.  The 1777 Maryland statute is an R
exception. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. R
300 MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. VI, art. VII.
301 See Neuman, supra note 188, at 564. R
302 The Framers considered and rejected a proposal that the Suspension Clause con-
tain a time limit. 1 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 976 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed.,
1986).  When asked why the Suspension Clause in the United States Constitution did not
have a time limitation like that of the Massachusetts clause, Judge Dana responded that “he
did not see the necessity or great benefit of limiting the time” because Congress, like the
state legislature, could renew the suspension year after year.  The Massachusetts Conven-
tion, supra note 215, at 1359.  The “safest and best restriction,” he pronounced, was em- R
powering Congress to suspend only in cases of rebellion or invasion. Id.  For “whenever
these shall cease to exist, the suspension of the writ must necessarily cease also.” Id.
303 The endpoint of suspension under the Clause is unclear.  Many have assumed,
both at the Convention, see supra note 302 and accompanying text, and the years since, see R
supra note 173 and accompanying text, that the Clause itself permits suspension only so R
long as rebellion or invasion lasts.  One might also argue, however, that the Clause permits
suspension so long as the threat to public safety lasts, even once the rebellion or invasion
has ended.  It is unnecessary to resolve that issue here.  Thanks to Sai Prakash for drawing
the question to my attention.
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whether it is wise to omit an expiration date, Article I, Section 9 does
not prevent Congress from doing so.  Congress can direct the Presi-
dent to gauge the lifespan of his authority according to a standard
(such as the phrase “during the present rebellion”) rather than by a
firm date.
There is a similar lack of textual basis for geographic restrictions.
One strand of the argument for geographic limits maintains that a
suspension must be confined to location of the rebellion or inva-
sion.304  As David Currie observes, however, this argument “miss[es]
the mark.”305  “Rebellion” and “invasion” are conditions that trigger
the possibility of emergency power, not descriptions of the power’s
geographic reach.  The Clause permits suspension “when the public
Safety may require it,” and it is sensible to interpret this phrase as
permitting suspension wherever the public safety requires it, even if
that means detention in an area outside the battle zone.306  That is
not to say that the public safety prong of the Clause itself requires a
suspension statute to specify where the President may exercise emer-
gency power.  The Suspension Clause speaks to when the writ may be
suspended,307 but it is silent as to where.  That is perhaps because it
does not always make sense to think of emergency power in terms of
fixed geographic limits.  The danger to public safety lies with those
intent on inflicting harm, and their location will not necessarily coin-
cide with the region hit.  For example, the architects of an attack may
have worked remotely, and those who are on location can move
quickly to avoid detection or strike a new area.  Preventative detention
is aimed at people, not places.  It is instructive in this regard that early
state suspension statutes, as well as the bill proposed during the Burr
Conspiracy, defined the Executive’s emergency power according to
the category of people he could detain rather than the place where he
was likely to find them.308  To be sure, Congress can include a geo-
304 See supra note 107; see also Shapiro, supra note 8, at 94 (suggesting that the Clause R
authorizes suspension only in the location where a rebellion or an invasion occurs); Tyler,
supra note 2, at 692 (opining that “the existence of a rebellion in one part of the country is R
not . . . a justification for suspending the writ in another part of the country”).
305 David P. Currie, The Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1161 (2006).
306 See id. (asserting that “so long as an insurrection [is] in progress, the Constitution
permit[s] suspension whenever and wherever the public safety require[s],” not only in the
areas where rebellion is occurring).  Consider, for example, that damage inflicted by a
terrorist attack on Manhattan might render a larger geographic area unstable, endanger-
ing the public safety in, say, New Jersey or Connecticut.
307 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 2 (prohibiting suspension “unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it” (emphasis added)).
308 Some defined the category as those suspected of treason; others defined it as any-
one dangerous to the state. See supra notes 63, 69, 72, 75 and accompanying text.  The R
English suspensions enacted between 1689 and 1747 did not contain geographic restric-
tions, but the Revolutionary War suspension did: it applied only to those taken for treason
or piracy in America or on the high seas. See 17 Geo. 3 c. 9 (1777); HALLIDAY, supra note
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graphic restriction in a suspension statute, just as it can include a sun-
set clause.  It did so in the Ku Klux Klan Act, which authorized the
President to suspend the writ only “within the limits of the district
which shall be so under the sway [of rebellion].”309  Such a provision
is protective of civil liberty insofar as it cabins the President’s emer-
gency power, and its inclusion may be prudent when the risk to public
safety is concentrated in a particular area.  But the Clause does not
require Congress to impose geographic limits upon either the power to
detain or the authority to declare a suspension effective.  It is agnostic
on the question, thereby leaving the matter to the political process.310
As to whether subdelegation is permissible with respect to the de-
cisions to suspend or arrest: the parliamentary and state suspension
acts almost always provided that only the king or chief executive and
the equivalent of cabinet-level officials could sign warrants issued pur-
suant to the emergency power granted by the legislation.311  The rea-
sons for such a limitation are clear.  It is, first and foremost, a means
of quality control: high-ranking executive officials are more accounta-
ble to the public for abuses of the power, and their selection for office
is at least some indication that they possess good judgment.  It is also a
means of quantity control: when fewer people have the power to
preventatively detain, fewer arrests will be made.  Notwithstanding the
long tradition of including such a restriction in suspension statutes,
however, none of the proposed or enacted federal statutes included it.
To be sure, that omission was controversial.  The fact that the suspen-
sion statute proposed during the Burr Conspiracy did not so limit ex-
ercise of the detention power was one of the stated reasons for its
rejection.312  During both the Civil War and Reconstruction, critics
insisted that the President should not be able to delegate either the
decision to suspend or the decision to detain to low-ranking of-
ficers.313  But the Clause does not address the matter either expressly
47, at 249 (“Until 1777, suspensions made no distinction among law’s subjects by national- R
ity or by place of capture or detention.”).  This geographic restriction was one of the more
controversial aspects of the act. See Halliday & White, supra note 16, at 646–51.  Some R
claimed that the regional limitation protected liberty by reducing the number affected, see
id. at 645, but others, including Edmund Burke, thought it better to suspend uniformly, for
“[p]eople without much difficulty admit the entrance of that injustice of which they are
not to be the immediate victims.” See id. at 650 (quoting A Letter from Edmund Burke, Esq. . .
on the Affairs of America 15 (2d ed. London 1777)); see also id. (“Liberty, if I understand it all,
is a general principle, and the clear right of all the subjects within the realm, or of none.”).
309 See Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17 Stat. 13. (1871).
310 During that process, regional interests can lobby for the inclusion of such restric-
tions. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R
311 See supra notes 51, 64 and 66.  The suspension enacted and repeatedly extended by R
Parliament during the Revolutionary War did not include such a limitation. See supra note
55 and accompanying text. R
312 See supra note 76 and accompanying text. R
313 See supra notes 119–22, 150 and accompanying text. R
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or impliedly.  The default presumption in administrative law, cap-
tured by statute, is that the President can enlist the aid of subordinates
in the discharge of his statutory duties.314  While Congress can clip
that authority by statute,315 it is difficult to argue that such a limit is
constitutionally required.  Like sunset clauses and geographic restric-
tions, any prohibition of subdelegation is a matter of prudence rather
than constitutional constraint.
CONCLUSION
The Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress broad author-
ity to implement legislation as it sees fit.  In the normal course, Con-
gress may pass statutes that are effective on a contingent basis, leaving
the President to determine when conditions triggering the statute are
satisfied.  The Suspension Clause, however, creates an important ex-
ception to that rule.  Its command that “[t]he Privilege of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it,” describes not only the cir-
cumstances under which Congress can authorize emergency power
but also the time at which Congress can enact the authorization.  Con-
gress cannot pass any suspension statute until it concludes that an in-
vasion or a rebellion exists and that the accompanying threat to public
safety may require it.  Only at that point may it capitalize upon the
President’s ability to react quickly by charging him to make the ulti-
mate determination whether and when maintaining security requires
the exercise of emergency power.  While Congress has significant lee-
way to act independently of triggering events in the context of social
and economic regulation and in areas of inherent executive authority,
the Suspension Clause limits Congress’s freedom to do so when it sus-
pends civil liberties.
This approach to the Suspension Clause captures more precisely
what it means for the suspension power to be legislative.  Giving the
power to the legislature means more than that the President’s power
to act must derive from a statute.  It means that Congress must assess a
current security crisis to determine whether it requires the exercise of
emergency power.  There are times of “extreme emergency” in which
314 See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (authorizing the President to “empower the head of any
department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is required to be
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval,
ratification, or other action by the President . . . any function which is vested in the Presi-
dent by law”); see also 3 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (acknowledging that the President may have an
“inherent right . . . to delegate the performance of functions vested in him by law”).
315 Cf. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.7 at 126 (5th ed.
2010) (“Sometimes [Congress] chooses [to prohibit or limit subdelegation] because it con-
siders a function so important that it wants that function performed only by a high ranking
official.”).
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“the nation parts with its liberty for a while, in order to preserve it
forever.”316  Entrusting the legislature with the power to determine
when those times arrive is one of the safeguards of our liberty, and its
role in that regard is embedded in the Clause itself.
316 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 217, at *132. R
